Monday, January 18, 2010

July 6, 2005

Alberto Gonzales visited Iraq on Sunday. His visit was described as being "aimed at highlighting the efforts to build a functional criminal justice system in Iraq." It also inadvertently highlighted the security situation.

Gonzales had to travel to Iraq under intense secrecy and heavy guard out of fear insurgents would target him. After arriving at Baghdad airport early Sunday, he was temporarily stranded there while waiting out a sandstorm that had grounded helicopters. Insurgents have made the nine-mile road into the city's center too dangerous to drive. His presence in Baghdad was not revealed publicly until he was safely inside the Green Zone, the walled compound of former palaces and parks that serve as a shaky refuge for coalition forces and the Iraqi government.1
The whole episode is strange. Gonzales' presence drew attention, apparently by design, to the assignment of Americans to help prop up the Iraqi justice system, which hardly aids arguments that Iraq has a sovereign and effective government. In addition, sending one of the architects of prisoner abuse to Iraq demonstrates an impaired political sense; his reputation in that regard no doubt explains the fear that he might be targeted. He made the blunder worse by offering, during his visit, this ridiculous, self-exculpatory claim:
To believe that memos and decisions at the top created an environment that led to abuses would lead one to the conclusion that these abuses were widespread, at many locations and by many people. From the best we can tell, it really related to the actions of the night shift at one cell block at Abu Ghraib.2
Back home, Mr. Gonzales is under attack from another quarter. The possibility that he might be nominated to the Supreme Court has provoked criticism and threats of opposition from conservative groups who suspect that his commitment to the pro-life position is less than absolute. However, Republican Senators wouldn't be likely to buck the President or say unkind things about an Hispanic nominee, and his upposedly moderate "social" views might endear him to the perpetually confused Democrats.
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1. washingtonpost.com 7/4/05.
2. http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/07/03/gonzales.iraq.visit.ap
A shorter form of the statement appears at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8450249 ; www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-07-03-gonzales-visit_x.htm?POE=NEWISVA; and www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,161441,00.html . All are from Associated Press.

July 7, 2005

Veterans for Peace has posted a "Declaration of Impeachment" using the language of the Declaration of Independence to call for the impeachment of the current monarch named George.1 The adaptation is strained and the message obscure, but a news release informed us that the basis for impeachment would be "crimes committed during the invasion and occupation of Iraq."2 In mid-June, the Wisconsin Democratic Party adopted a resolution calling for Congress to initiate impeachment proceedings against Messrs. Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld "for their role in the war in Iraq." 3 Two weeks earlier, Ralph Nader called for an inquiry into impeachment of the President and Vice President based on their "manipulating and misstating intelligence concerning weapons of mass destruction and alleged ties to Al Qaeda, suppressing contrary intelligence, and deliberately exaggerating the danger a contained, weakened Iraq posed to the United States and its neighbors." 4

A memo to Representative Conyers has been posted on AfterDowningStreet.org which calls on the Judiciary Committee "to undertake an inquiry into whether sufficient grounds exist to impeach George W. Bush, the President of the United States," reciting that considerable evidence has emerged that Mr. Bush has "engaged in a conspiracy to deceive and mislead the United States Congress and the American people as to the basis for taking the nation into war against Iraq," that he has "manipulated intelligence so as to allege falsely a national security threat posed to the United States by Iraq," and that he has "committed a felony by submitting a false report to the United States Congress on the reasons for launching a first-strike invasion of Iraq".5

All this talk of impeachment may be unrealistic and might even seem delusional were it not for a Zogby poll showing that 42% "say they would favor impeachment proceedings if it is found the President misled the nation about his reasons for going to war with Iraq."6 As with other negative opinions about Bush and Iraq, this one would dissipate if things suddenly looked less grim, but it's striking all the same.

The Zogby poll hasn't had much play in the media, but yesterday Dan Froomkin's online column for The Washington Post discussed it in some detail 7 with a link to
PollingReport.com, which presents part of the poll results in table form.

The Republican Congress isn't about to vote for or even consider impeachment, but formally posing the issue could be a way of starting a debate about why we're in Iraq, how we got there and how we leave.

July 21, 2005

The media have been fascinated by the recent developments in the Wilson-Plame-Rove-Cooper-Miller saga. Some observers, including Richard Cohen1 and Frank Rich 2 have pointed out that this is a side show; it is at best a subtext of, at worst a distraction from, the more important issue: lying us into war. It is, however, the sort of personal, political, scandalous story which the media can grasp. If it helps them to understand and report on the more important, more abstract issue, it will have been worth the attention.

Thus far there isn't much indication of that. A fair amount of attention has been devoted to a side issue of the side issue: whether reporters' privilege has been abused and whether we need a federal shield law.

The jailing of Judith Miller brought this to the fore. Bill Keller, executive editor of Ms. Miller's paper, The New York Times, called her decision not to testify a "brave and principled choice." "Judy Miller made a commitment to her source and she's standing by it. . . . Anybody who believes government should be aggressively watched feels a chill up their spine today.' "3

The Times ran a page-length editorial on July 7 advancing those ideas. Much of what it said is valid, and the jailing of Ms. Miller seems harsh, unfair and unnecessary - certainly taking her away in shackles was all of that - but The Times' defense goes too far: "She is surrendering her liberty in defense of a greater liberty, granted to a free press by the founding fathers so journalists can work on behalf of the public without fear of regulation or retaliation from any branch of government." The editorial acknowledged that "this is far from an ideal case" for such a stand. However, its point was only that we do not know what the prosecutor is up to:

. . . We would not have wanted our reporter to give up her liberty over a situation whose details are so complicated and muddy. . . .
***

. . . The inquiry has been conducted with such secrecy that it is hard to know exactly what Mr. Fitzgerald thinks Ms. Miller can tell him, or what argument he offered to convince the court that his need to hear her testimony outweighs the First Amendment. . . . The shroud of secrecy thrown over this case by the prosecutor and the judge, an egregious denial of due process, only makes it more urgent to take a stand.

The secrecy, combined with Robert Novak's coy silence and the evasions by the White House, certainly creates a situation in which it is difficult - for me, at least - to decide what the issues are, and therefore whether Ms. Miller's refusal to testify is justifiable. However, The Times has a simple answer to the last question: a reporter always is on the side of the angels in refusing to name a source.

Such a refusal is, in theory, based on the importance to the public of knowing what the government is doing and the role of the reporter in disclosing that information. As the editorial put it,

The most important articles tend to be the ones that upset people in high places, and many could not be reported if those who risked their jobs or even their liberty to talk to reporters knew that they might be identified the next day. In the larger sense, revealing government wrongdoing advances the rule of law, especially at a time of increased government secrecy.
That certainly is true, but does Ms. Miller's situation come within the rule? The Times is not in a position to demonstrate that it does. This is not a case in which the reporter has revealed governmental misconduct and is protecting the source of that information. To the contrary, Ms. Miller may be protecting someone who was attempting to advance the administration's agenda by a retaliatory leaking of confidential information. Molly Ivins, in a column published Monday in The Seattle Times, assumed that to be true:
Miller is not protecting a noble whistleblower who dared to go to the press because his sense of integrity had been outraged by official misconduct and he had no other option. . . . She is, we can assume, protecting some politically motivated hatchet-man who was part of the smear campaign against Plame's husband for telling the truth. . . . 4
However, Ms. Ivins, like The New York Times, thinks that is "irrelevant to the principle involved." Is it? Should every refusal to name a source be protected? Ms. Miller may feel that she must refuse to identify her present source for fear that others will not trust her, but that is a prudential decision; the attempt to connect her refusal to high journalistic principle is unconvincing.

It also is ironic. Ms. Miller has not been noted of late for disclosing facts which the government wanted hidden. Her reporting on WMD in Iraq had exactly the opposite tendency: her sources were pushing the administration line. As she said recently, in defending her performance, "My job is to tell readers of the New York Times what the government thought about Iraq's arsenal." In other words, her reporting passed along what the administration wanted the public to think. Mr. Keller's news pages as a whole don't have a much better record.

If Molly Ivins' speculation is correct - and she's hardly alone in making it - the fact that Judith Miller did not write a story may show that she had the integrity not to cooperate in attacking Joseph Wilson through his wife. Robert Novak had no such scruple. She is in prison and he still is treated as a respectable journalist. Something is wrong with that picture, but no case has been made for applying reporters' privilege to Ms. Miller's refusal. Margaret Carlson put it this way: "The one good thing to come out of all this is that journalists have been reminded to say 'no' to those cowards trying to get revenge or dish dirt without putting their names on it. Our promise of confidentiality should be given for information that corrects an injustice, not perpetrates one."5

The Times at least understands the importance and function of reportorial confidence, though Judith Miller's plight has caused it to invoke the privilege too readily. The Cleveland Plain Dealer has reacted to the Miller case by abandoning its role as public watchdog. The Plain Dealer is sitting on two stories, which it says are of "profound importance," because it is afraid that its reporters might be subpoenaed.6 Mr. Fitzgerald, intentionally or not, has intimidated that paper, a result the administration would be happy to see become more general. Predictably, the Justice Department is opposing a bipartisan effort in Congress to pass a shield law, "calling the legislation 'bad public policy' that would impair the administration's ability 'to effectively enforce the law and fight terrorism.' "7

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1. The Washington Post 7/14/05.
2. The New York Times 7/10/05.
3. Editor & Publisher 7/6/05; http://editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000974355
4. www.creators.com/opinion_show.cfm?next=2&ColumnsName=miv
5. www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/views05/0714-28.htm (The Los Angeles Times 7/14/05).
6. Editor & Publisher 7/8/05; www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000976374
7. The Washington Post 7/20/05.

July 28, 2005

When General Myers referred to "the struggle against violent extremism" last month1 he was apparently trying out a new formulation for whatever it is that we are doing with reference to people who blow up themselves and others. The New York Times reported Tuesday that the administration is "retooling its slogan for the fight against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups," de-emphasizing the military aspect and posing the challenge as an ideological battle.2 Now we are engaged in a global struggle against violent extremism rather than the global war on terror (there goes GWOT).

Several rationales for the change were offered by administration spokesmen, none of them meaningful. The Times noted that Americans increasingly doubt the connection between the occupation of Iraq and combating terrorism, and observed, in a rare burst of cynicism, that the new theory "may allow the administration to put into broader perspective the daily mayhem in Iraq and the American casualties." That may be its motivation, but it is difficult to see why voters would consider casualties more acceptable under the new slogan. At least conducting a war on terrorism had a possible connection to homeland security, whereas struggling with violent extremism seems abstract and remote, as well as less assertive. Further retooling may be required.

In any case, there definitely is a change in rhetoric. The article quoted an official generally identified with the more uncompromising versions of neoimperialism:

Douglas J. Feith. . . said in an interview that if the nation's efforts were limited to "protecting the homeland and attacking and disrupting terrorist networks, you're on a treadmill that is likely to get faster and faster with time." The key to "ultimately winning the war," he said, "is addressing the ideological part of the war that deals with how the terrorists recruit and indoctrinate new terrorists."
When I read that, I doubted that it was to be taken at face value; for example, would he advocate withdrawing from Iraq because our presence has led to more terrorism? However, Wednesday's news revealed that some thought is being given to a partial withdrawal. The plan is couched in face-saving terms - a constitution is in the works, Iraqi defense forces will do better - but it may reveal a reappraisal of a disastrous policy. Then again, it may not. This administration is more noted for rhetorical shifts than for changes in policy, let alone admissions of error.
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1. See my note of June 27 .
2. www.nytimes.com/2005/07/26/politics/26strategy.html . The ideological part of the formula isn't new; see my notes of December 8, 2004 and December 16, 2004.

August 5, 2005

Either President Bush wasn't consulted when the global war on terror was renamed the global struggle against violent extremism or he has had second thoughts. In either case, he's still fighting the war. I had just learned that the acronym for the new slogan is G-SAVE; now it's back to GWOT.

Mr. Bush made his views known in two recent statements. The first was a speech on Wednesday to the American Legislative Exchange Council, in which he referred to the war on terror five times; just to be sure we didn't miss the point, he also told us four times that we are "at war." All together, there were more than a dozen references to war.1 On Thursday, Mr. Bush proclaimed during a joint press conference with the President of Colombia that "Iraq is a part of this war on terror, and we're at war."2 On both occasions, he promised to stay on the offensive, added on Wednesday that we are fighting the enemy in Iraq so that we do not have to fight them here, and on Thursday vowed to stay the course. In short, for him nothing has changed. Whatever the advantages of the alternative paradigm, the President prefers the mantle of war leader, and he may think that the new slogan detracted from his persistent attempt to tie what we're doing to 9-11; he made that connection on both occasions.

The reaffirmation of the war model also may be connected to the continuing drive to create unlimited power in the executive branch.
When the photos taken at Abu Ghraib surfaced, we were told that the abuses were the actions of a few low-level soldiers and did not represent the principles of the American people. We learned before long that they did reflect the policies of the American government, recorded in memos of startling amorality. The administration's response to the photos, to the memos and to its own investigations has been to ignore the proof, to continue its utterly implausible defense, to protect and even promote those most intimately involved in developing and implementing the policies, and to resist efforts to prevent recurrence. This is happening not simply because the administration wants to be able to use these methods or needs to look tough, but because it is determined to be above the law, at least in any area which can be labeled "national security." There was another assertion of this claim recently.

Three Republican Senators, Warner, McCain and Graham, proposed amendments to the defense spending bill which would prohibit abuse of prisoners. Vice President Cheney met with them to argue against the new rules, asserting that "legislation on these matters would usurp the president's authority and - in the words of a White House official - interfere with his ability 'to protect Americans effectively from terrorist attack.' " The White House has threatened to veto the bill if it contains the anti-abuse language.3

With royal prerogative at stake, Bush may think that he needs to cry war rather than merely struggle against extremism.

August 8, 2005

Some ideas are best expressed simply. George Bush's aversion to nuance may reflect his inability to grasp details, subtleties or implications, but it is effective politically.

He was on the receiving end Saturday. Cindy Sheehan, whose son was killed serving in Iraq, went to Crawford to ask Mr. Bush for the reason, putting her questions with stunning bluntness: "I want to ask the president, 'Why did you kill my son? What did my son die for? Last week, you said my son died for a 'noble cause' and I want to ask him what that noble cause is."

Mrs. Sheehan was stopped short of the royal enclosure, but National Security Adviser Steven Hadley and someone named Joe Hagin came out and talked with her. She was appreciative of the gesture: "They were very respectful. They were nice men." However, their explanations were the tired official line, to which she had a ready response: "They said we are in Iraq because they believed Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, that the world's a better place with Saddam gone and that we're making the world a safer place with what we're doing over there. . . I told them Iraq was not a threat to the United States and that now people are dead for nothing."1

Mrs. Sheehan's last question was prompted by the President's recent efforts to justify the casualties. In his speech on Wednesday Mr. Bush said that those who have been killed in Iraq have died in a noble cause and that we must honor their sacrifice by completing the mission. (One of his assistants parroted that formula in response to Mrs. Sheehan's visit.) In the press conference on Thursday, a reporter noted the number of Marines killed last week and asked what is being done to improve their safety. Mr. Bush offered no answer, instead urging the families of the fallen to "take comfort in the understanding that the sacrifice was made in a noble cause."2 However, it is difficult to see any nobility in his frequently-redefined "cause" and certainly none is lent by ignoring the question of whether military vehicles are death traps.

August 12, 2005

Is there an exit strategy for the noble cause in Iraq?

Over the past several months, there have been numerous comments about reducing the number of American troops, currently about 138,000. In March, the Army Vice Chief of Staff stated that the force level probably would decline in early 2006; "senior military officials" said that it could be down to 105,000 by that time. Also in March, the commander in Iraq predicted a significant reduction starting next spring, an opinion he reaffirmed in July. In June, his second in command estimated that 20,000 could be withdrawn after the December elections. On August 7, it was reported that the head of Central Command had presented a plan to reduce troop strength by about 20,000 to 30,000 by next spring. On Thursday, we were told that the plan is to reduce the force to 100,000 by mid-2006. All of the predictions were conditioned on the ability of the Iraqis to provide for their own security. (This implies that we are providing security now, which is debatable, but never mind).

By contrast, President Bush - who made a point recently of reaffirming that we are at war - said on Thursday that "pulling the troops out" would send the wrong signal to the enemy, "immediate" withdrawal would show terrorists that we are weak, and pulling troops out "prematurely" would betray the Iraqis. (Whether these distinction are meaningful is anyone's guess.) Mr. Bush said that no decision has been made about force levels and any comments by others about reduction were just speculation.1

We have been here before. From September through November of 2003, there were numerous reports of withdrawal plans. The reports had two themes: transfer of security responsibility to Iraqis would be accelerated ("Iraqization" and "Iraqification" were coined), and plans were in place to reduce the U.S. military personnel in Iraq significantly by the following spring or summer. One estimate had the U.S. troop strength down from 130,000 (occasionally given as 132,000) to 105,000 by May, 2004. Others had the force at 90,000 to 100,000 by summer 2004 and 40,000 to 50,000 by summer 2005.

However, Mr. Bush stood aside from any such discussions and eventually repudiated the idea of withdrawal. In October, 2003, he ducked a reporter's inquiry on force reduction, calling it a "trick question." In November, he declared that we would stay "until the job is done," which he defined as creating a free and peaceful Iraq. Later that month he sarcastically denied having said that he wanted to begin bringing troops home the following year.

Eventually, transfer of "sovereignty" to Iraq was accelerated in the hope that this would facilitate force reduction.

Nearly two years later, American forces in Iraq still total more than 130,000. We are pressuring the Iraqis to cobble together a constitution by August 15, hoping that this further step toward sovereignty will change the situation. We're still predicting that Iraqi units can take over security duties. Nothing has changed except the number of casualties; American military fatalities at the beginning of September, 2003 were 289; today they are 1,846. No wonder Mr. Bush's poll numbers on Iraq are down.

August 14, 2005

The current Ben Sargent cartoon has President Bush at work during his vacation; his task: coming up with the platitude of the day.1 Whether the platitudes are original to Mr. Bush or are a staff product, they are prominent in all of his statements, formal or relatively unrehearsed. They play an important role in his remarks, to disguise controversial actions or prettify unpleasant facts. The President's description of the occupation of Iraq falls into the former category, and his insincere expressions of sympathy or grief over lives lost there fall into the latter, as exemplified by his radio message on Saturday. 2

After reminding us that the war on terror arrived on our shores on September 11, 2001, claiming that we are fighting terrorists abroad so that we don't have to face them here at home, explaining that we're spreading the hope of freedom across the Middle East, and declaring that we are laying the foundations of peace, he referred to the casualties by remarking that the path to victory in the war on terror will include difficult moments; our nation grieves every death, our hearts go out to the loved ones who mourn, but "even in our grief, we can be confident in the future, because the darkness of tyranny is no match for the shining power of freedom." It is enough to make one gag.

The administration's limited inventory of ideas, most of them morally indefensible, and the President's intellectual and rhetorical shortcomings require that platitudes, euphemisms and other forms of rhetorical smokescreen also function as policy statements. His radio address again provides an example.

Mr. Bush obviously has been upset by the discussion of possible reductions in the number of American troops in Iraq. Apparently any hint of withdrawal is embarrassing, even though the predictions were conditioned on improvements in security. Perhaps he was afraid that someone on the imperialist right would accuse him of cutting and running; if so, he was ready, catch-phrase for catch-phrase: "The terrorists cannot defeat us on the battlefield. The only way they can win is if we lose our nerve. That will not happen on my watch." Never mind whether our actions make any sense; never mind that the Casey Sheehans do the fighting and dying: no one is going to say he's not tough enough.

Probably that policy-by slogan is only for the short term. Even Mr. Bush must realize that, whatever the original aim, the occupation of Iraq has become a disaster and must be brought to an end. An article in The Los Angeles Times revealed a possible outline of his long-term plan, quoting Ivo H. Daalder of the Brookings Institution:

"I think we are going to end up where the Pentagon wants to end up. . . ." But, Daalder said, the recent rhetorical tension might reflect the president's desire to announce troop withdrawals after next winter's election of a permanent Iraqi government rather than against the backdrop of this summer's violence. That way, Daalder said, the president could argue "we are leaving in a position of strength." 3
Mr. Bush talked around that concept on Saturday. He started by repeating one of his policy substitutes: "As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." However, later he seemed to hint at a somewhat different plan, albeit in code: "Withdrawing our troops from Iraq prematurely would betray the Iraqi people, and would cause others to question America's commitment to spreading freedom and winning the war on terror." Most of this is a meaningless flourish, but the reference to premature withdrawal echoes a statement Mr. Bush made during his news conference on Thursday. The repetition suggests that it was not used carelessly and that the issue is not withdrawal but timing.

The question then arises, when would withdrawal not be premature? All that was offered Saturday was more flag-waving: "So we will honor the fallen by completing the mission for which they gave their lives, and by doing so we will ensure that freedom and peace prevail." If completing the mission means ending the insurgency, withdrawal may be a long time coming. However, two elections may provide the time frame. If the Iraqis come up with something resembling a constitution next week and if it is ratified in October, there will be a general election in December. Mr. Bush then could declare victory, in the form of a self-governing Iraq, and begin the pullout early next year, just as the "speculation" has it, in time to influence the important election, the one here in November, 2006.

The mission then would be defined as the removal of Saddam Hussein and the transfer of full sovereignty to Iraq, which would be declared to be democratic and ready to provide its own security.

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1. Austin American Statesman 8/13/05, carried on washingtonpost.com.
2. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050813.html
3. Brownstein & Mazzetti, "War Messages That Don't Quite Match" 8/13/05;

August 22, 2005

Frank Rich's column in The New York Times on August 14 was entitled "Someone Tell the President the War Is Over." His view is that, for an increasing number of Americans, there is no justification for going on. He summed up the growing disenchantment by quoting the people: "We're outta there."

One might expect dissent from the right. However, the only negative reactions I've seen have come from the other direction. Chief among them is a column by Norman Solomon on Wednesday captioned "Someone Tell Frank Rich the War Is Not Over,"1 written for Truthout and reproduced on a number of web sites.

Mr. Solomon's first point is that the war may drag on for years. It seems apparent that, despite the President's cowboy rhetoric, the administration is planning on, or at least hoping for, a significant reduction in forces next year, but that does not equate to complete withdrawal. That may, as Solomon predicts, come much later.

His other point is that it is "pernicious" to claim that the people have decided that the war is over because it will cause complacency and discourage efforts to bring all the troops home promptly. Possibly, although the opposite might be true.

Mr. Solomon doesn't explain why he thinks that American forces will remain in Iraq for a long time, other than by analogy to Vietnam, but there are two more specific reasons to wonder whether his prediction is accurate.

The first has to do with the elephant which has been in the room from the outset: oil. Whatever one may conclude about the reasons for the invasion - I'm inclined to think that they were a poorly sorted, barely analyzed jumble, held with differing degrees of passion and in differing priority rankings by the major players - Iraqi oil was a factor. Our continuing dependency on foreign oil, the competition for oil from the rest of the world, especially China, and our apparent lack of any alternative plans make the large Iraqi reserves vitally important. How, at this point, the administration might think that it could ensure control of or priority access to Iraqi oil is unclear, but it would be no surprise if such an aim still figured in its plans, including military ones.

Permanent military bases pose the other issue. Even apart from the implications of the first point, planting bases in Iraq was on the agenda from the beginning and, despite disclaimers, still may be.

Any discussion of "withdrawal" needs to address the entire subject, not merely the beginning of the drawdown, but Democrats have avoided the subject. Some think that we must clean up the mess we've made, that we mustn't desert the Iraqis, that terrorism will be worse if we leave. These are respectable and responsible concerns but I think that the weight of evidence is against the notion that a large, continuing American military presence is the solution to any of them.

In any case, as long as the discussion is limited by such considerations, the administration will not be forced to disclose its plan, or the lack of one. Probably only a demand for full disengagement by a specific date would accomplish that. Senator Feingold has introduced a resolution asking for a timetable for withdrawal and a statement of goals,2 which is likely to be ignored. More recently he has proposed full withdrawal by the end of 2006. 3 If he were to put that in his resolution, and if his more timid colleagues supported it, the administration might be forced to tell us where it's going.

August 30, 2005

There may be an exit strategy for Iraq, but Mr. Bush seems determined to establish that it isn't his idea.

Initially, he seemed to be finessing the issue, rejecting "immediate" or "premature" withdrawal, leaving open the possibility of at least partial withdrawal later. However, during the past week he has been all over the map, in more than one sense.

In a press conference last Tuesday, Mr. Bush said that we have a two-track strategy in Iraq, the first track being political. That seemed to endorse the notion underlying the military's withdrawal plans, that a constitution and an election would be signs of progress which would justify lowering the force level. (The other track, which he didn't discuss, is providing security.) However, Mr. Bush made discussion of withdrawal from Iraq more difficult by identifying it with a general retreat: "I think those who advocate immediate withdrawal from not only Iraq but the Middle East would be -- are advocating a policy that would weaken the United States."1

In a speech the following day, Mr. Bush again rejected immediate withdrawal from Iraq or "the broader Middle East." He then appeared to repudiate any thought of withdrawal, now or later, complete or partial: "So long as I'm the President, we will stay, we will fight, and we will win the war on terror."2

In his radio address on Saturday, Mr. Bush warned that our efforts "in Iraq and the broader Middle East will require more time, more sacrifice and continued resolve." What are these efforts of ours in the mysterious broader Middle East? He didn't say, other than to add this: "People across the Middle East are choosing a future of freedom and prosperity and hope. And as they take these brave steps, Americans will continue to stand with them. . . . By advancing the cause of liberty in the Middle East, we will bring hope to millions and security to our own citizens." 3 That sounds like he has more in mind than extending good wishes or applying a bit of diplomatic pressure; do foolish new adventures lie ahead, rather than withdrawal? Perhaps not; the resolve and sacrifice may apply only to Iraq.

However, there are those who still are keen on remaking the Middle East in our image; on Monday The Washington Post gave us columns by Jackson Diehl and Robert Kagan indicating a desire to dictate the terms of the election in Egypt. Mr. Bush's comments may mean that he harbors similar ambitions, that he is searching for another quagmire to wade into. On the other hand, they may be his way of putting the generals in their place or of hedging his bets, or they may simply be more neo-Wilsonian high-mindedness and more faux-cowboy bluster. Perhaps the theory is that brave talk is needed now, to disguise his timidity about confronting Cindy Sheehan, and no one will remember any inconsistency if he announces a drawdown next year. After all, he admitted that there is no evidence of a connection between Iraq and 9-11, but implies it virtually every time he opens his mouth, and no one seems to mind.

Meanwhile, the Iraqis delivered a blow to the withdrawal plans by turning constitution-drafting into ethnic conflict. Mr. Bush called the failure as a success, describing it as "completing the next step in their transition from dictatorship to democracy," and looked ahead to the election which would follow ratification. 4 That may take us full circle to the military program of election-stability-withdrawal, but how would one know, in the midst of all this blather?

September 6, 2005

On Sunday, Frank Rich noted certain similarities in President Bush's responses to 9-11 and Hurricane Katrina.1 The first is hopping on a plane and flying away from the trouble. In the recent case, that meant a trip to San Diego on August 30 to celebrate V-J day by lobbing applause lines to an audience of sailors and veterans. As Michael Tomasky pointed out,2 there wasn't even the excuse of an anniversary, as V-J Day occurred on August 15, 1945 (or August 14 in some reckonings).

Two things were notable about that speech,3 one an addition to the inventory of rhetorical devices justifying the war, the other possibly a glimpse of policy. The former was an attempt to equate the invasion and occupation of Iraq with World War II: it's another defense of the homeland, another crusade to spread freedom.

The latter was a rare reference to possession of Iraq's oil fields, long suspected to be a motive for the war. However, it wasn't our possession that was in issue, at least ostensibly: "If Zarqawi and bin Laden gain control of Iraq, . . . they'd seize oil fields to fund their ambitions . . . ." His response to that threat was a pledge to "build a free Iraq that will fight terrorists." Therefore he may only have meant that he wants a strong Iraqi government which can control its major asset - or he may have let the cat peek out of the bag.

Even if we assume that he meant that the Iraqis should be in charge of the oil fields, it leaves room for speculation about our motives. The administration's version of a free and independent Iraq always has been a bit limited, Iraq's sovereignty a little suspect. Another sign of that came last Tuesday. The American ambassador joined a Sunni spokesman in calling for revisions to the supposedly final draft of the constitution.4 We're in favor of Iraqi independence and sovereignty so long as they do things our way.

Mr. Rich pointed to another parallel between 9-11 and Katrina, false denial of any advance warning. Condoleezza Rice on 9-11: "I don't think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, take another one and slam it into the Pentagon. . . ."5 The President on Katrina: "I don't think anyone anticipated the breach of the levees."6

There is a third parallel, the emphasis on posturing. The results, however, have been different. Mr. Bush's bull-horn speech in New York four years ago was as phony as most of his actions, but it drew rave reviews. This time, his visits to the scene, or somewhere near it, have been dismissed as a vain attempt to play catch-up, and his response to the tragedy has been the subject of widespread, bitter criticism, not without reason. Take one example: at the New Orleans Airport on Friday, he stated that the convention center was "secure" and implied that the people there had food and water. On the same day, there were these headlines: " 'Hope is Fading' at New Orleans Convention Center" (NBC, MSNBC); "New Orleans Slides into Chaos; US Scrambles to Send Troops" (The Los Angeles Times); "Local Officials Criticize Federal Government over Response" (The New York Times); "New Orleans Mayor Lashes Out at Feds" (CNN).

Mr. Bush also said this during his visit to the airport:

I believe that the great city of New Orleans will rise again and be a greater city of New Orleans. (Applause.) I believe the town where I used to come from, Houston, Texas, to enjoy myself -- occasionally too much -- (laughter) -- will be that very same town, that it will be a better place to come to."7
I assume that he meant to say that New Orleans, not Houston, would be a great party town again. (The White House appears to have mispunctuated the transcript). I don't know who laughed at that mangled line - George? his staff? someone shocked into a nervous reaction? - but it wasn't funny or appropriate. It was typical of many comments by this clumsy, insecure, insensitive man.

Some of the criticism of the federal response may be exaggerated, but the lack of preventive action, the inadequate funding, the bureaucratic reshuffling, the appointment of unqualified managers, the diversion of forces and equipment to Iraq, the slow, confused rescue efforts, the blame-shifting and, more than anything else, the tax cuts demonstrate not only how unready this administration is to deal with a disaster, but how unfit it is to govern.

September 13, 2005

The President of Iraq has been reminded that sovereignty is what George Bush says it is. Yesterday, President Talabani told The Washington Post that there are 60,000 "well-trained" Iraqi troops now, that 100,000 of them would be well trained by year's end, and that this could facilitate American withdrawal. Asked how many Americans could leave, he said that, although it is a matter for coordination between the Iraqi and American military, in his opinion at least 40,000 to 50,000 American troops could leave by the end of this year.1 He might have been overly optimistic about the readiness of Iraqi troops - every forecast to date has been - but his comment set a significant goal and may have expressed a preference. Apparently he was reminded in this morning's meeting that Iraq is not yet ready to have goals or preferences. As Mr. Bush put it at today's joint press conference, "President Talabani and I discussed our strategy for the months ahead;"2 that is, he was told who's making the strategy.

Accordingly. Mr. Talabani had a different view of things today; his remarks could have been written, and perhaps were, by the White House spin team: "The American and international presence in Iraq is vital for democracy in Iraq and in the Middle East, and also [to] prevent foreign interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. We will set no timetable for withdrawal, Mr. President. A timetable will help the terrorists, will encourage them that they could defeat a superpower of the world and the Iraqi people. " Mr. Bush, ever gracious, praised the Iraqi President's return to proper subservience: "I pledge we will not waver, and I appreciate your same pledge."

Perhaps on his own, or perhaps reflecting the administration's Iraq posture of the week, Mr. Talabani added that it would be nice if, by the end of next year, his forces could relieve "many" American troops, but only if the Americans agree, because we don't want to send the wrong signal, etc.

Mr. Bush repeated his slogan: as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. Yesterday Mr. Talabani made the mistake of assuming that the slogan encapsulated a policy and that Iraqis should help implement it. Now he knows otherwise, and has learned that sovereignty doesn't necessarily involve making decisions.

September 24, 2005

Hurricane Rita presents President Bush with another opportunity to demonstrate that he is the decisive leader, the protector of America that an increasingly small percentage of the people see. The first attempt to restore his image, the strange, almost surreal New Orleans speech, didn't help much. A few who wrote about the speech were fooled, but most were able to see that it was a desperate and insincere effort to restore his standing.

Public response was not much more positive. An Associated Press-Ipsos Public Affairs poll showed a rise in total job-approval rating from 39% before the speech to 40% after, but on "handling the relief effort for victims of Hurricane Katrina," approval remained at 46%, and those thinking that the federal government should have been better prepared rose from 69% to 70%. Perhaps no more was expected; an unidentified "former Bush aide" described the speech as a tourniquet. A Gallup poll indicated that it didn't even stop the bleeding: Mr. Bush's job-approval rating dropped from 46% before the speech to 40% after and approval of his handling of Katrina dropped from 43% to 41%.

Other answers in the AP poll were interesting: 65% percent thought that we are spending too much on Iraq; for a plurality of 42%, cutting that spending would be the first choice in funding the Katrina relief.1

Now another impending tragedy allows Mr. Bush a second chance. It isn't likely that he suddenly has become a leader, so we must hope that FEMA, DHS and the other agencies are better prepared, although the White House press briefing on September 21 would give little cause for optimism. Scott McClellan avoided direct answers to repeated questions as to how the response to Rita would be better than to Katrina. The following day, he ducked another such question, but did offer more detail as to preparations. On the 21st, he avoided answering whether anyone at the White House had been assigned to coordinate relief efforts and on the 22d was vague about the role of Frances Townsend, the President's homeland security advisor.

The President's role also is unclear. Mr. McClellan stated on the 22d that the plan was for Mr. Bush to fly to Texas to "get a firsthand look at the preparations that are underway for Hurricane Rita and to show our support for the first responders . . . ." Several questions suggested that this was merely a photo-op, one asking whether the White House wanted a better image than that of the President playing with a guitar while Katrina devastated New Orleans. Apart from registering his annoyance at the guitar reference, Mr. McClellan didn't offer much rebuttal.2

The second stop on Mr. Bush's trip was to be at the headquarters of the Northern Command in Colorado. Exactly what that has to do with Hurricane Rita was less than clear; the story was that the President could "get a firsthand look at the federal government's assistance that is going on with state and local preparations and response efforts during Hurricane Rita." In attempting to explain what that meant, Mr. McClellan blundered into a discussion of the contentious issue of military forces being used for domestic law enforcement, and acknowledged that Mr. Bush is considering expanding the military's domestic role.

One notable feature of the post-Katrina period is that reporters have become more aggressive. Those questioning Scott McClellan were persistent and none too gentle, but the real news is in the tone of the questions to the President. On Friday, during a visit to FEMA headquarters, he announced that, on the way to Colorado, he was going to visit San Antonio "to see the pre-positioned assets, understand the relationship -- or that the federal government's role is to support state and local governments," whatever that might mean. He took three questions, which illustrate the new mood: "Sir, what good can you do going down to the hurricane zone? Might you get in the way, Mr. President?" "But I mean, how -- what good can you actually do? I mean, isn't there a risk of you and your entourage getting in the way?" "But critics might say this is overcompensation for the response to Katrina." He had no answers, other than to say that he wouldn't get in the way.

His explanation of the trip to Colorado didn't improve on Scott McClellan's. According to the President, he wants to "watch the interface between our United States military, and . . . the state and local authorities."3

Mr. Bush left for Colorado yesterday, but the planned stop in San Antonio was cancelled, apparently because the "pre-positioned assets" would be on their way out of town. Perhaps on the way back, he can catch some that are moving more slowly.

September 28, 2005

The ascendancy of the Republicans is due in no small part to the fact that, for large segments of the public and of the media, words are more important than deeds.
Republicans talk tough, so they are the party of national security, regardless of performance.

The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, bringing to the fore the administration's deficiencies in "homeland security," seemed to change the focus. Suddenly, results counted, not rhetoric. The New York Times and The Seattle Times did backslide a bit on Tuesday by carrying front-page headlines reporting that the President had called upon people to save gas by driving less. His hesitant comment ("people just need to recognize that the storms have caused disruption and that if they're able to maybe not drive when they - on a trip that's not essential, that would [be] helpful" 1) hardly was the stuff of headlines and, given the administration's record on conservation, deserved reporting only with irony.

It received that treatment elsewhere, in stories pointing out the size of presidential motorcades, the cost of flying Air Force One, and the pointlessness, apart from photo-ops, of the President's hurricane trips, which CNN.com underscored by putting the link to its report on the most recent trip under the heading "Politics." The NYTimes article with the errant headline noted the administration's poor record on conservation, including Mr. Cheney's dictum that conservation is merely a personal virtue.

The more aggressive behavior by reporters also continued. Scott McClellan was asked numerous pointed questions on the topic on Tuesday, including whether the President would curtail his travel or shorten his motorcades and, more importantly, about his hint that the domestic authority of the military might be increased and about Iraq. The most dramatic exchange came on the last topic. It started with an odd question, whether the President had communicated with last weekend's counter-demonstrators, those supporting the war. This, for no obvious reason, led McClellan into a defense of Iraq policy in which he nearly reached the limit of banality, only to be rudely interrupted.

Well, I think the American people recognize the importance of what we are working to accomplish in the broader Middle East. Iraq is a key part of establishing a foundation for lasting peace and security. What we're working to do is lay a foundation of peace for our children and grandchildren. And the President has made it very clear that his number one priority is the safety and security of the American people. And we are engaged in a global war. It is a war that is -- that continues. The President said after September 11th, that some would tend to forget. He will not. We are going to stay on the offensive until we win this war, and we're going to work to spread freedom and democracy to address the --

Q How many are you going to kill, in the meantime?2

Good question. It should have been asked earlier; let's hope that this wasn't the last time.
_____________________________

1. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050926.html
2. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050926-2.html

October 8, 2005

One of the anomalies of the Bush image is the tendency of the forceful leader, our bold defender, toward touchy-feely decision making.

There is the famous evaluation of Vladimir Putin: "I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straight forward and trustworthy and we had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul."

Mr. Bush also looks into hearts. In defending his choice of John Ashcroft as Attorney General, Mr. Bush described him as "a man who has got a good and decent heart." In confirmation hearings, Mr. Bush said, "he'll withstand the scrutiny about his fairness and his heart" and if the Senators "take a look at . . . Senator Ashcroft's heart and his record, they'll confirm him." He employed the same vetting process for his most recent nominee, Harriet Miers, about whom he said, "I know her heart, I know her character." Last year, he told us "I know Secretary Rumsfeld's heart."

In these three cases, there was a reason for warm generalities: to evade questions about Ashcroft's alleged racial bias, Miers' lack of qualifications and Rumsfeld's failure to personally sign condolence letters. However, they still show a surprising tendency toward goopy expressions for a brush-clearing cowboy, that real fella all those white males want to have a beer with.

Values are a constant point of reference for this administration. A person of such sensibility might be expected to possess elevated values - positive, admirable, humane principles - and that claim is made. However, the real picture is quite different.

Mr. Bush has spoken of values on many occasions, but the content of that concept has been elusive. In the campaign last year, it seemed to come down to reverence for the institution of marriage," "respecting human life," and "appointment of federal judges who know the difference between personal opinion and the strict interpretation of the law." The first is limited to opposing abortion; otherwise respect for life is notably absent. Preserving marriage means not allowing homosexuals to marry. Strict interpretation of the law translates into decisions Mr. Bush favors, which pushes the quest for his values back another step, to the principles revealed by his actions.

If one looks at the domestic side, the tendencies hardly are admirable: fiscal irresponsibility, disregard for the environment, pandering to corporations, tax giveaways to the hyper-rich, indifference to the problems of the poor and of working people, disdain for civil liberties, disguising propaganda as news, hiring and appointing unqualified cronies, elevating ideology over the common good.

When looking abroad, Mr. Bush has referred to "universal values," which include "human rights and human dignity," but concern for either is difficult to detect in his policies. Instead, he has demanded the power to detain people indefinitely without charge, and has condoned, if not encouraged, torture. The Senate passed the McCain anti-torture amendment to the defense appropriation bill 90-9; the White House has threatened a veto.

The White House web site tells us that Mr. Bush is "committed to ushering in a responsibility era in America," but personal responsibility is for other people, as his reaction to the Abu Ghraib scandal shows.

The President's most enduring expression of values is an unprovoked and immoral war launched and prolonged in a fog of lies.

October 30, 2005

The Libby indictment has provoked various reactions.

There had been predictions that any indictment which dealt only with perjury or obstruction would be attacked as trivial. Nicholas Kristof rehearsed that argument in his New York Times column on Tuesday. We "should be uneasy," he told us, that Mr. Fitzgerald "is said to be mulling indictments that aren't based on his prime mandate, investigation of possible breaches of the 1982 law prohibiting officials from revealing the names of spies." He deplored the prospect that the result might be "mushier kinds of indictments, for perjury, obstruction of justice or revealing classified information." His point was that special prosecutions have been abused, citing the investigations of Clinton and Cisneros, and declaring, rightly enough, that excess against Democrats is excess against Republicans. However, the circumstances of the Libby case are not similar to the earlier examples. In Cisneros' case, the charge was lying about the amount of payments to an ex-mistress; in Clinton's case, it was lying about a tawdry affair. Neither is exactly a matter of state. Covering up efforts to discredit a critic who exposed a lie which led us into war is another matter.

A few of the administration's defenders have made the Kristof argument. Orrin Hatch claimed in a CNN interview on Friday that Fitzgerald fell back on secondary charges because Valerie Plame Wilson wasn't a covert agent and therefore no one committed a crime in disclosing her identity. "If there was no underlying crime committed, then one has to ask, why then would you bring five count [sic] against a servant in the government who may or may not have done something wrong?"

Another version appeared in a column in Saturday's Washington Post by David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, lawyers in the Justice Department under Reagan and Bush I. Like Hatch, they claimed that Mrs. Wilson was not a covert agent and therefore there was no underlying crime and, like Kristof, argued that special prosecutors, because of the nature of their positions, tend to abuse their authority. (They also managed to see the leak to Robert Novak as "an effort to set the record straight, and to put the whole story before the American people.") In their view, the Libby indictment is proof of prosecutorial abuse because Fitzgerald has alleged only crimes which occurred during the investigation. "In other words, there was no crime when the investigation started, only, allegedly, after it finished." That would be a more or less accurate summary of the Clinton case, but not necessarily of this one. Their conclusion was that no special prosecutor ever should be appointed and that investigations such as this should be left to the Justice Department. Their criticisms of special prosecutors and independent counsel have some merit in the abstract, but it's naïve to think that a department under the direction of John Ashcroft or Alberto Gonzales would aggressively pursue charges against advisors to the President and Vice President. In any case, the authors did not explain why the crimes alleged are not worthy of prosecution.

A variation on the theme is the claim that the indictment criminalizes political disputes. Emily Messner's "The Debate" blog on the Post's web page posed that question Saturday, but cited only Robert Novak for the affirmative, not the most persuasive authority.

The Post's editorial page gave the indictment a qualified vote of approval. It rejected the notion that the charges were mere technicalities: "No responsible prosecutor would overlook a pattern of deceit like that alleged by Mr. Fitzgerald." However, it deplored the contempt charges against reporters. The Post also reserved its right to think that the war was a good idea despite its origin in lies: the indictment does not "prove (or refute) charges that President Bush misled the country about the grounds for war." However, it proves, at the least, that the administration was panicky about any inquiry into those grounds.

The Times' editorial page was more definite in its approval of the indictment and reminded its readers that the more significant point, from which all of this flows, is that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

The indictment followed by a few days the 2000th American military fatality in Iraq, thereby combining an insight into the origin of the war with a reminder of the cost. That tragic milestone was not reached by a slow accretion; 84 have died to date in October, already making it the fifth-worst month of the war. The total now is 2017.


______________________

1. 11/3/05: The total for October was 96, the fourth-highest; for the war it's 2037. http://icasualties.org/oif/

November 7, 2005

When reports of its own major errors become a permanent feature of a newspaper, two conclusions are possible: the paper is honest, candid and determined to do better, or it makes too many mistakes. In the case of The New York Times, both are appropriate.

The pattern began with the Jayson Blair fiasco, which resulted, in May, 2003, in a front-page admission of error, the resignations of its two top editors the following month, and a self-examination project which produced a memo two years later outlining the ways in which such errors would be avoided and, incidently, recommending that the news pages appear less liberal.

In May, 2004, the Times acknowledged, in a column by "the editors," that its coverage of WMD issues, significantly but not exclusively by Judith Miller, was gullible and slanted or, as the editors put it, "information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged." In this area at least, any taint of liberalism had been avoided.

The most recent confession had to do with Ms. Miller's role in the Plame-Wilson-Libby affair and her jailing for contempt. On October 16, another front-page article reported that the paper had failed to keep Ms. Miller under control and had allowed her situation to inhibit its coverage of the Fitzgerald investigation. The article also suggested delicately that Times management had gone overboard in declaring that her jailing made her a martyr to journalistic principle.

One notable feature of the current episode is that op-ed writers have joined in the criticism of the papers's news operations, something I don't recall seeing before. In his column on October 31, Paul Krugman did so in the course of describing the failures of the media in dealing with the myths created by the Bush administration:

. . .[T]here is much harsh, justified criticism of the failure of major news organizations, this one included, to exert due diligence on rationales for the war. But the failures that made the long nightmare possible began much earlier, during the weeks after 9/11, when the media eagerly helped our political leaders build up a completely false picture of who they were.

The stunner was Maureen Dowd's column on October 22. Captioned "Woman of Mass Destruction," it denounced Judith Miller and criticized the paper for encouraging her excesses:

. . .Sorely in need of a tight editorial leash, she was kept on no leash at all, and that has hurt this paper and its trust with readers. . . .

Judy's stories about W.M.D. fit too perfectly with the White House's case for war. She was close to Ahmad Chalabi, the con man who was conning the neocons to knock out Saddam so he could get his hands on Iraq. . . . Using Iraqi defectors and exiles, Mr. Chalabi planted bogus stories with Judy and other credulous journalists.
The paper was wrong not only in its failure to supervise Ms. Miller, but in its too-eager defense of journalistic principle: "I admire Arthur Sulzberger Jr. and Bill Keller for aggressively backing reporters in the cross hairs of a prosecutor. But before turning Judy's case into a First Amendment battle, they should have nailed her to a chair and extracted the entire story of her escapade." Her evasions make people wonder "whether her stint in the Alexandria jail was in part a career rehabilitation project."

Ms. Dowd did not stop with the Times' mistakes but also found its confession to be less than complete: "The Times' story and Judy's own first-person account had the unfortunate effect of raising more questions." As for Ms. Miller's future,

Judy told The Times that she plans to write a book and intends to return to the newsroom, hoping to cover ''the same thing I've always covered -- threats to our country.'' If that were to happen, the institution most in danger would be the newspaper in your hands.

Strong stuff; what do we make of it? Has the Times allowed this as a demonstration of its sincerity? Will Ms. Dowd be punished for lèse majesté? Is Bill Keller about to follow Howell Raines into retirement? However that may sort out, the Times needs to do better; three major blunders in two and one-half years is not reassuring to a reader turning to it for reliable information and sensible commentary. Among other things, the paper needs a sense of proportion and priority. It has overreacted to the Blair scandal but does not yet fully understand how wrong it has been on Iraq and on the Bush administration's policies and practices in general.

November 10, 2005

The 2000th American military fatality in Iraq drew some attention, more so than the seemingly more symbolic 1000th. There are numerous reasons for the different response. One, possibly, is that the second milestone was reached in less time than the first; it took seventeen months to reach 1000, thirteen to add another thousand deaths.

The interval in itself probably isn't a major factor, but it reflects a significant and dismal pattern. Fatalities averaged 51.8 per month over the nine-plus months of the war in 2003, which included the heaviest fighting, during the invasion. In 2004 the average was 70.7. For 2005, through October, it is 69.5 and this month is on a pace to exceed 80. The occupation has been more deadly than the formal war and shows no sign of becoming less so. People are weary of that.

If Bush were to stay the course, news of the 3000th fatality might arrive just in time for the midterm elections. That prospect may lead to a partial withdrawal, even if more principled arguments do not.

November 12, 2005

As George Bush's ship sinks, he clings to part of the wreckage that doesn't float.

The President turned his Veteran's Day speech1 into a defense of the Iraq war, insisting that the cause is noble and that "it is deeply irresponsible to rewrite the history of how that war began," the latter coming right after he rewrote history to claim that the reason for the war was "the liberation of Iraq." On the stage behind Mr. Bush was a huge sign reading "Strategy for Victory," something few people believe he has. He vowed that "we will never accept anything less than complete victory," but it is likely that he will do just that.

In attempting to deflect criticism of the war, Mr. Bush invoked 9-11 and implied a connection to Iraq. That has become a familiar pattern, but yesterday's version was especially goofy: "Some have also argued that extremism has been strengthened by the actions in Iraq -- claiming that our presence in that country has somehow caused or triggered the rage of radicals. I would remind them that we were not in Iraq on September the 11th, 2001." Well, yes; but the Iraqi insurgents weren't involved in 9-11, and "the rage of radicals" in Iraq is a result of our occupation.

Reports of the speech in the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Seattle Post-Intelligencer pointed out various weaknesses in Mr. Bush's position, including questions about his credibility. The P-I added that a recent poll "found the Iraq war at the core of Americans' displeasure with the president." The LA Times article, also carried in the Seattle Times, pointed out that, in another poll, "55% said they believed the Bush administration 'intentionally misled the American public' in making its case for war." That isn't the sort of response Mr. Bush wanted.

It seems odd that the White House, in its desperation, would resort to a strident reassertion of an argument most people don't believe, but then which pieces of the USS Bush Administration do still float?

November 29, 2005

Critics of the Bush administration have accused it of distorting intelligence in order to sell the war in Iraq. Apart from personal attacks, of which an accusation of irresponsibility is the mildest, the rebuttal has been that "everyone, including Congressional Democrats, believed they [WMD] were there," as a column in last Thursday's P-I asserted. One branch of the argument is that the Clinton administration believed it. This is intended to persuade us that Mr. Bush and his colleagues merely presented the same data and that the invasion was justified. David Brooks provided the supposed proof of the identity of Clinton and Bush views in The New York Times on November 3.

The Brooks code

Brooks' column, entitled "The Harry da Reid Code," combined attempts at irony and humor. Mr. Brooks is too earnest to be good at either, and the humor ended up as leaden goofiness. The irony consisted of quoting Mr. Clinton and several members of his administration on the subject of Iraqi arms followed by "These comments were part of the Republican plot to manipulate intelligence on Iraq" or a slight variation thereof. That fell equally flat, and not only because of its stylistic shortcomings.

If Mr. Brooks had said only that members of the previous administration had believed that Iraq had WMD of some sort, there would be no controversy. However, he attempted, true to the current line, to use that fact to discredit criticism of Bush misrepresentation. The argument is that statements by one administration validate distortions by another.

All of the quotes were taken out of context in one or more ways. Here they are as presented by Mr. Brooks, followed by the relevant longer passages, with the portions he extracted in italics:

1. "Clinton argued, 'Iraq still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions and the capacity to restart quickly its production program and build many, many more weapons.' ''

The UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions, a small force of Scud-type missiles, and the capacity to restart quickly its production program and build many, many more weapons.

Now, against that background, let us remember the past here. It is against that background that we have repeatedly and unambiguously made clear our preference for a diplomatic solution.1

Possibly the omission of the reference to Iraq's short-range missiles was intended to disguise the fact that Iraq had no significant delivery system for its hypothetical WMD. That gap led President Bush to fantasize about "unmanned aerial vehicles."

Mr. Clinton emphasized the success of inspections, even in the face of interference.

The inspection system works. The inspection system has worked in the face of lies, stonewalling, obstacle after obstacle after obstacle. The people who have done that work deserve the thanks of civilized people throughout the world.

It has worked. That is all we want. And if we can find a diplomatic way to do what has to be done, to do what he [Saddam] promised to do at the end of the Gulf War, to do what should have been done within 15 days within 15 days of the agreement at the end of the Gulf War, if we can find a diplomatic way to do that, that is by far our preference. . . .

There was an implied threat to use military force, if necessary, as a means of compelling compliance.

2. "William Cohen, Clinton's defense secretary, went on national television and informed the American people that if Saddam has 'as much VX in storage as the U.N. suspects' he would 'be able to kill every human being on the face of the planet.' ''

. . . If he, in fact, has as much VX in storage as the UN suspects he might, to be able to kill every living human being on the face of the planet, then this is not simply Iraq against the United States, but Iraq against the United Nations -- Iraq against the international community at large. So it's a problem that he has managed to highlight, but it's much bigger than Saddam Hussein and that's the reason why this report, I think, is important -- to continue to point out that there are other nations who are, in fact, engaged in similar behavior.

What is the good news? The good news is that we have passed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. That has put into effect a means of stopping the production, the storage, the dissemination of chemical weapons and allows for verification. It sets up a regime to discourage those countries who are not signatories to the treaty or the convention, to be able to acquire certain precursor chemicals from the countries who have signed it . . . .2

Iraq is not exactly the unique threat of Bush propaganda. The report referred to was entitled "Proliferation: Threat and Response." Secretary Cohen said that "details in this report lay out the dangers that are posed by Iraq and other countries as well. It makes a very chilling point. More than 25 countries either have or may be developing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons." In answer to a question about the use of military force against Iraq, he said "Military force is always an option, but as I've indicated before, it's not a first option. It's something that we would reserve only as a last option and it's one that the President in consultation with our allies would have to make a determination on." His discussion contemplated reliance on inspections.

3. "Secretary of State Madeleine Albright compared Saddam to Hitler and warned that he could 'use his weapons of mass destruction' or 'become the salesman for weapons of mass destruction.' "

QUESTION: . . . could you please shed some light on what you might imagine as the worst possible scenario and our outlook on support should we need it?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: . . . I think the worst scenario is that Saddam could actually break out of the box that we have kept him in for seven years. I hope it was clear in my remarks that we have managed to contain him for seven years, and that the UN has managed to destroy huge amounts of his weapons of mass destruction.

One of the really bad scenarios is that he breaks out and that he is able to actually move through the Middle East and move into Saudi Arabia and really destabilize the entire region and seize energy supplies. Another scenario is that he could, in fact, somehow use his weapons of mass destruction. Another scenario is that he could become the salesman for weapons of mass destruction; that he could be the place where people come and get more weapons. . . .

So there are very bad scenarios. . . And there are a lot of lessons, but for me some of the most important ones are that if you don't stop a horrific dictator before he gets started too far, then he can do untold damage. To the young man who said we're not going to shed blood -- send Americans out again, if the world had been firmer with Hitler earlier, then chances are that we might not have needed to send Americans to the Second World War.3

Contrary to Brooks' claim, Dr. Albright was not "warning," but imagining worst-case possibilities, and those only if the policy of containment failed. It is clear in retrospect that it succeeded. In addition, although she counseled firm and timely action, she wasn't pushing for an invasion or a war for regime change.
We would look forward to working with a regime other than Saddam Hussein; and I know that the Iraqi people would. . . . So our goal here is, as I said, to diminish his ability to threaten with weapons of mass destruction and to threaten his neighbors. There is no plan to use ground forces. There are some ground forces in the region in Kuwait, and they are there in order to repel in case Saddam should decide to move south again. But believe me, we have no intention of doing that, nor do we ever intend to shed American blood for purposes that are not achievable. . . .
Shedding American blood for purposes that are not achievable sums up the present plan.

4. "Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, warned that 'Saddam's history of aggression, and his recent record of deception and defiance, leave no doubt that he would resume his drive for regional domination if he had the chance. Year after year, in conflict after conflict, Saddam has proven that he seeks weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, in order to use them.' ''

Saddam's history of aggression, and his recent record of deception and defiance, leave no doubt that he would resume his drive for regional domination if he had the chance. Year after year, in conflict after conflict, Saddam has proven that he seeks weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, in order to use them.

Our strategy for meeting this threat has been one of containment, based on four pillars:

First, we have maintained international sanctions against Iraq, exempting food and medicine, in order to deny Saddam the resources he needs to rebuild his military.

Second, we have supported UNSCOM: the UN inspection mission--to ensure Iraq fulfills its pledge at the end of the Gulf War to destroy its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, and the missiles needed to deliver them.

Third, we have maintained the credible threat of force to deter Saddam's aggression and to hold him to his obligations, and proven we are willing to act, if need be alone, to defend our interests.

Fourth, we have worked to keep our friends and allies united in pursuit of these goals.

Since the Gulf War ended, this strategy has essentially held Saddam in check. We have prevented him from aggression against his neighbors and forced him to back down whenever he has tried to cripple or expel UNSCOM. In spite of Saddam's continuing deception, UNSCOM has forced Iraq to declare and destroy, among other things, almost 40,000 chemical weapons, almost 700 tons of chemical weapons agents, 48 operational missiles, 30 warheads fitted for chemical and biological weapons, a nuclear centrifuge program, and a massive plant designed to produce anthrax.4

Again, the context is a policy of containment, not of preemptive war.

The foregoing comments were made during the Clinton years, in 1997 or 1998. The remaining quotes are from statements made during the Bush presidency, the first two prior to the invasion of Iraq, the last after.

5. "Al Gore declared that Saddam Hussein 'has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country.' ''

Moreover, if we quickly succeed in a war against the weakened and depleted fourth rate military of Iraq and then quickly abandon that nation as President Bush has abandoned Afghanistan after quickly defeating a fifth rate military there, the resulting chaos could easily pose a far greater danger to the United States than we presently face from Saddam. We know that he has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country.

We have no evidence, however, that he has shared any of those weapons with terrorist group [sic]. However, if Iraq came to resemble Afghanistan - with no central authority but instead local and regional warlords with porous borders and infiltrating members of Al Qaeda than these widely dispersed supplies of weapons of mass destruction might well come into the hands of terrorist groups.5

He pointed out that there was no evidence for one of the chief excuses for the war, transfer of WMD to terrorists. The chaos in Iraq isn't due to abandonment, but it is fortunate that there were no WMD, as Mr. Gore's prediction might have proved accurate.

The focus of his speech was criticism of the Bush doctrine of preemptive war. He suggested focusing on the real enemy, "those who attacked us on September 11th." He criticized the politically expedient timing of the call for war.

6. "Clinton assistant secretary of state, Robert Einhorn, said at a Congressional hearing, 'Today, or at most within a few months, Iraq could launch missile attacks with chemical or biological weapons against its neighbors.' ''

How close is the peril of Iraqi WMD? Today, or at most within a few months, Iraq could launch missile attacks with chemical or biological weapons against its neighbors (albeit attacks that would be ragged, inaccurate, and limited in size). Within four or five years, it could have the capability to threaten most of the Middle East and parts of Europe with missiles armed with nuclear weapons containing fissile material produced indigenously -- and to threaten U.S. territory with such weapons delivered by non-conventional means, such as commercial shipping containers. If it managed to get its hands on sufficient quantities of already-produced fissile material, these threats could arrive much sooner.6
This quote is the most legitimate from Mr. Brooks' standpoint. Mr. Einhorn advocated revised sanctions on Iraq and renewed inspections, but concluded that regime change was required and generally must be counted as a Bush ally in this debate, at least as of the time of this statement.7 However, even here Brooks altered the statement by omitting an inconvenient comment about Iraq's limited short-term capabilities.

7. "Clinton National Security Council staffer Kenneth Pollack has written, 'The U.S. Intelligence Community's belief toward the end of the Clinton administration [was] that Iraq
had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program and was close to acquiring nuclear weapons.' ''

. . . The U.S. intelligence community's belief toward the end of the Clinton Administration that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and was close to acquiring nuclear weapons led me and other Administration officials to support the idea of a full-scale invasion of Iraq, albeit not right away. The NIE's judgment to the same effect was the real linchpin of the Bush Administration's case for an invasion.

What we have found in Iraq since the invasion belies that judgment. . . . 8

Mr. Pollack's comments were in an article entitled "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," published in early 2004. He was a supporter of the invasion, but by the time of the article had come to realize that intelligence had been both wrong and misused. His conclusion is relatively mild: "The one action for which I cannot hold Administration officials blameless is their distortion of intelligence estimates when making the public case for going to war. As best I can tell, these officials were guilty not of lying but of creative omission." Even that hardly supports the notion that Bush merely repeated Clinton's warnings.

However, Pollack's discussion revealed much more than creative omission. He reported receiving numerous complaints from people in the intelligence agencies and "the policy community" about how the Bush Administration handled intelligence. "According to them, many Administration officials reacted strongly, negatively, and aggressively when presented with information or analysis that contradicted what they already believed about Iraq."

Reportedly, the worst fights were those over sources. The Administration gave greatest credence to accounts that presented the most lurid picture of Iraqi activities. In many cases intelligence analysts were distrustful of those sources, or knew unequivocally that they were wrong. But when they said so, they were not heeded; instead they were beset with further questions about their own sources.
The administration apparently was getting some of its intelligence from conservative pundits: "Requests were constantly made for detailed analyses of newspaper articles that conformed to the views of Administration officials - pieces by conservative newspaper columnists such as Jim Hoagland, William Safire, and George F. Will." And manipulation did not stop with pressuring existing intelligence agencies:
As Seymour Hersh, among others, has reported, Bush Administration officials also took some actions that arguably crossed the line between rigorous oversight of the intelligence community and an attempt to manipulate intelligence. They set up their own shop in the Pentagon, called the Office of Special Plans, in order to sift through the information on Iraq themselves. To a great extent OSP personnel "cherry-picked" the intelligence they passed on, selecting reports that supported the Administration's pre-existing position and ignoring all the rest.

Distortions: the National Intelligence Estimate

Mr. Pollack's comments lead us back to the real issue, the distortion of the facts in aid of convincing the Congress and the people to support a war. The NIE, termed by Pollack the "linchpin" of that argument, was part of that program of distortion. Former Senator Bob Graham recently provided some background.

In September, 2002, CIA Director Tenet was asked what the National Intelligence Estimate "provided as the rationale for a preemptive war in Iraq;" the reply was that no NIE had been prepared. Senator Graham then asked for an NIE, which was produced three weeks later.

He evaluated it as follows:

There were troubling aspects to this 90-page document. While slanted toward the conclusion that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction stored or produced at 550 sites, it contained vigorous dissents on key parts of the information, especially by the departments of State and Energy. Particular skepticism was raised about aluminum tubes that were offered as evidence Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. As to Hussein's will to use whatever weapons he might have, the estimate indicated he would not do so unless he was first attacked.9
The origins of the intelligence raised further concerns:
Under questioning, Tenet added that the information in the NIE had not been independently verified by an operative responsible to the United States. In fact, no such person was inside Iraq. Most of the alleged intelligence came from Iraqi exiles or third countries, all of which had an interest in the United States' removing Hussein, by force if necessary.
Graham asked that an unclassified version be produced, which was done; however, it
"represented an unqualified case that Hussein possessed them [WMD], avoided a discussion of whether he had the will to use them and omitted the dissenting opinions contained in the classified version."

In addition to the manipulation of the NIE, information on specific issues was distorted as it was presented to the public. The examples below are limited to those in which false or misleading information was presented by those publicly pushing the war, primarily Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld and Rice, and which was known to them to be suspect if not worse.

Distortions: the aluminum tubes

The "particular skepticism" about the aluminum tubes was significant. The administration claimed that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear capability and that the tubes were to be used in centrifuges which would refine uranium. Despite warnings that the tubes were unsuited to that purpose, Iraq's acquisition of them was offered repeatedly as proof of Iraq's nuclear program.

On September, 8, 2002, National Security Advisor Rice asserted, apparently based on nothing but rhetorical utility, that the tubes were "only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs."10 On September 12, in his address to the United Nations, President Bush said "Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon."11

On September 13, The New York Times disclosed that some experts in the State and Energy Departments "had questioned whether Iraq might not be seeking the tubes for other purposes, specifically, to build multiple-launch rocket systems." It noted that the administration had tried to play down the dispute. On September 19, The Washington Post reported a study by David Albright, a physicist and former member of the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspection team, which questioned whether the tubes were intended for centrifuges.

On October 7, President Bush said "Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons."12

As noted, the NIE of October, 2002 included dissenting opinions about the tubes. It included this comment by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (for some reason referred to as INR):

In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. . . .13
On December 19, Secretary Powell, in criticizing Iraq's disclosure to the Security council, said "We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear weapons program."14 It is interesting that he ignored the findings of his department on this issue.

The IAEA reported on January 9, 2003, that the most likely use for the tubes was in rockets. "While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it." 15 The inspectors' opinion was public knowledge; Paul Wolfowitz was asked about the IAEA report on January 23.16

Despite the warnings that his claim was false, President Bush repeated it in the State of the Union address on January 28: "Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities." Actually, he had; the Iraqis said the tubes were for rockets.

Secretary of State Powell, in his presentation to the U.N. Security Council in February, acknowledged that there were differences of opinion, but did not present any of the negative evaluations and maintained that the only logical explanation was use in centrifuges.

The IAEA reiterated its negative finding on March 7, 2003. It again found the probable use to be for rockets, and noted that "Iraq's efforts to import these aluminum tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme." 17

The Iraq Survey Group (Duelfer) report of September 30, 2004 (Vol II, pp. 22 et seq.), comprehensively reviewed and rejected the argument that the tubes were designed or intended for centrifuges.

Distortions: uranium from Africa

There is the infamous story about Iraq's attempts to obtain uranium from Niger (or Africa, or "abroad"). Among other forums, the story was told to Congress in the State of the Union address on January 28, 2003: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." 18 Dumping responsibility on the Brits was the only concession to the known unreliability of the information. If Mr. Bush had said "the British government has told us that Iraq has attempted, etc.," he would have been at least formally truthful, if still duplicitous; by claiming that the British had "learned" something which was false or at least highly suspect, he told an untruth. The CIA had warned the White House several months earlier that the information about uranium was unreliable.

The story unraveled almost immediately after it was told in January. By early June, NS Advisor Rice had acknowledged that including the uranium claim in the President's speech was a mistake. By then, there was public discussion of the forgery of the documents on which the claim had been based. In early July 2003, the White House officially admitted error, but still scrambled to salvage something of its credibility. To that end, it declassified part of the October, 2002 NIE to support its claim. However, that, embarrassingly, included this comment by the INR: "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious."

Condoleezza Rice tried to have it both ways, feeling "personal responsibility" for the"episode" while maintaining that the false information had been "credible." Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley, became the principal fall guy.

On July 22, Hadley acknowledged that he had received a phone call on about October 5, 2002 from Tenet, advising him to remove a reference to the uranium claim from a speech prepared for the President to deliver on the seventh. Hadley received two memos from the CIA to the same effect on October 5 and 6; one of those also was addressed to Rice. The reference was removed from the October speech, but Hadley claimed to have forgotten about the warning by the time of the State of the Union.19

However the uranium claim also found its way into a report by the President to Congress, an op-ed piece by Dr. Rice, another document issued by the White House, a speech by Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, a speech by Secretary Powell, an address to the Security Council by Ambassador Negroponte and a prepared statement to a news conference by Secretary Rumsfeld, all between January 20 and 29, 2003. 20 Its presence in the State of the Union address on January 28 was part of a concerted campaign, not the result of forgetfulness.

On March 7, 2003, after the various speeches and papers but before the war began, the IAEA declared the documents to be "not authentic" and discounted the entire uranium purchase story.

The origin of the forged documents still is being investigated.

Distortions: Iraq's nuclear program

All of the talk about uranium from Africa and aluminum tubes was in aid of the administration's argument that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons. The threat and the case for immediate action were wrapped up in the mushroom-cloud warning, first delivered by Condoleezza Rice in September, 2002. Asked how close Iraq was to having nuclear weapons, she dodged, but painted as bleak a picture as possible:

You will get different estimates about precisely how close he is. . . .

We know that he has the infrastructure, nuclear scientists to make a nuclear weapon. And we know that when the inspectors assessed this after the [1991] Gulf War, he was far, far closer to a crude nuclear device than anybody thought, maybe six months from a crude nuclear device.

The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don't what the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.
***

We do not want to be surprised again. History shows that you are always surprised about how quickly someone acquires a terrible weapon. . . . 21

Mr. Bush repeated the punch line a month later: "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." 22 However, this was simply fearmongering.

On February 14, 2003, the IAEA, in a preliminary report of its renewed inspections, stated "We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq." At that point, it was unable to respond to the specific allegations about imports of uranium and aluminum tubes. However, three weeks later, it could.

The portions of the March 7 report by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei rejecting the uranium and tube claims have been quoted above. Here are its conclusions regarding the nuclear issue in general:

. . . Since the resumption of inspections a little over three months ago - and particularly during the three weeks since my last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated:


    There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.
    There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.
    There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminum tubes in question.

    Although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.

    As I stated above, the IAEA will continue further to scrutinize and investigate all of the above issues.

    After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq....23

Al Qaeda

Alleged ties to al Qaeda were central to the argument for war. The allegation was made in several contexts, including Iraqi involvement in 9-11, which was - and still is - implied rather than stated. I'll discuss two claims: the general one that there was a link of some sort, and the more specific allegation that Iraq provided training to al Qaeda operatives in biological or chemical warfare.

Distortions: the al Qaeda link

The administration pushed the supposed link relentlessly. One of the earliest references was a casual comment by President Bush on September 25, 2002. He was asked whether he thought that Iraq was a bigger threat to the United States than al Qaeda. Toward the end of an inane response, he said "you can't distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror."24 Given the context, one might suspect that the comment was not meant seriously, but doubt was removed the next day:"The [Iraqi] regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist organizations. And there are al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq."25

On October 7, 2002, Mr. Bush alleged more specific contacts: "We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade." 26 A week later, he slipped in the implied connection to 9-11, often a feature of the al Qaeda argument: "September the 11th changed the equation, changed our thinking. It also changed our thinking when we began to realize that one of the most dangerous things that can happen in the modern era is for a deceiving dictator who has gassed his own people, who has weapons of mass destruction to team up with an organization like al Qaeda." 27 Later the same day he said "This is a man that we know has had connections with al Qaeda. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qaeda as a forward army." 28

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld joined the chorus with an uncharacteristically muddled statement on September 21, 2002: "He [Saddam] has relationships with terrorists [sic] networks and there are al Qaeda currently in the country so he is a classic example of the nexus between a terrorist state and well advanced weapons of mass destruction programs and relationships with terrorists." 29

The New York Times reported on September 27, 2002, that Mr. Bush described Saddam Hussein as "a man who hates America, a man who loves to link up with Al Qaeda."

Vice President Cheney did his bit on December 2:

There is also a grave danger that al Qaeda or other terrorists will join with outlaw regimes that have these weapons to attack their common enemy, the United States of America. . . . Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror. . . His regime has had high-level contacts with al Qaeda going back a decade and has provided training to al Qaeda terrorists.30
On January 20, 2003, Rumsfeld added the 9-11 hint: "He openly praised the attacks of September 11th. His regime plays host to terrorist networks, and has ordered acts of terror on foreign soil." 31

Secretary Powell echoed the warning on January 26, 2003:

. . . The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again.

The nexus of tolerance and terror, of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, is the greatest danger of our age. . . . .32

However, the connection was suspect, and publicly so, from the outset. In July, 2002, USA Today reported that, although only "tenuous links have surfaced between Iraq and al-Qaeda," an intensive attempt was underway to establish such a link because administration lawyers had concluded that it would provide an excuse for the invasion.33 News reports noting the lack of evidence for a link appeared in August34 and September,35 2002. The former included a comment by Senator Hagel: "Saddam is not in league with al-Qaeda. Of course he cheers and encourages them. But I have not seen any intelligence that would lead me to connect Saddam Hussein with al-Qaeda."

On October 8, 2002, Knight-Ridder reported that unidentified "military officers, intelligence professionals and diplomats" charged that administration hawks had "exaggerated evidence of the threat that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein poses, including distorting his links to the al-Qaida terrorist network," and had squelched dissenting views, and that intelligence analysts were "under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the White House's argument that Hussein poses such an immediate threat to the United States that pre-emptive military action is necessary." 36 This view was confirmed by an article on August 8, 2003, citing the views of three named analysts that "the prewar evidence tying al Qaeda to Iraq was tenuous, exaggerated, and often at odds with the conclusions of key intelligence agencies." 37

Although the story had been challenged, and was weak from the outset, the administration stayed the course. Here's a rather lame reiteration by Condoleezza Rice on November 15, 2002:

Q . . . how can you show the American people that the threat -- the description of Iraq as part of the war against terrorism is not a simple convenience, given that the war against terrorism is politically popular, and it is very difficult for people to see a connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda that even senior intelligence officials question?

DR. RICE: We know one thing about bad guys -- they tend to travel in packs. They do tend to help each other, they do tend to coalesce around issues. Saddam Hussein has a long terrorist past. Whether it is in support of Palestinian rejectionists or the Abu Nidal organization, or helping some al Qaeda operatives gain training in CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear], or having meetings with -- between Iraqis and al Qaeda in various parts of the world, there's a relationship here.38

In his State of the Union address, Mr. Bush invoked the specter of Iraqi-al Qaeda collaboration: "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own."

At the Security Council, Colin Powell devoted a significant part of his argument to the supposed connection. Much of it was vague and, in the end, it was a defensive rejection of the weakness of his case:

Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and Al Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and Al Qaida together, enough so Al Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that Al Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction.39

On the same day, a British defense intelligence assessment was leaked. The document, written three weeks earlier, took the opposite view to Powell's presentation. A news article summed up the leak as follows:
The classified document, written by defence intelligence staff three weeks ago, says there has been contact between the two in the past. But it assessed that any fledgling relationship foundered due to mistrust and incompatible ideologies.

That conclusion flatly contradicts one of the main charges laid against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein by the United States and Britain - that he has cultivated contacts with the group blamed for the 11 September attacks.40

It quoted from the document: "His [Bin Laden's] aims are in ideological conflict with present day Iraq."

Shaky or not, the argument had its intended effect. Polls showed that in February, 2003, 56% believed that "Iraq gave substantial support to al Qaeda." In June, 2003, it was 61%, in March, 2004, 57%.41 The duplicitous al Qaeda-9/11 argument-by-hint, which continues to the present, also worked: included in the numbers above are those who believed that Iraq was directly involved in 9-11. That group reached its peak in June, 2003, at 25%.

The 9-11 Commission Report, issued in 2004, confirmed that the skeptics were right; it found no evidence that any contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda "ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship." (p. 66)

Distortions: weapons training

The administration alleged that Iraq was training terrorists in the use of chemical or biological weapons. Dr. Rice apparently started this on its way, in an interview on The News Hour on PBS in September, 2002:

We clearly know that there were in the past and have been contacts between senior Iraqi officials and members of al-Qaida going back for actually quite a long time.

We know too that several of the detainees, in particular some high ranking detainees, have said that Iraq provided some training to al-Qaida in chemical weapons development." 42

Mr. Bush streamlined the story in October: "We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." 43

Colin Powell told the tale to the U.N. Security Council in February, 2003, with a dramatic ending. After describing Iraq's "offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates," he declared: "The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal."

The claim was based on the testimony of a captured al Qaeda operative, Ibn al-Shaykh, also called Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. However, in February 2002, that testimony was declared unreliable by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in a Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITSUM):

This is the first report from Ibn al-Shaykh in which he claims Iraq assisted al-Qaida's CBRN efforts. However, he lacks specific details on the Iraqi's involved, the CBRN materials associated with the assistance, and the location where training occurred. It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers. Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest.

Saddam's regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control." 44

Newsweek, in an article about the report, added: "A DIA official confirmed to NEWSWEEK that the DITSUM report . . . was circulated at the time throughout the U.S. intelligence community and that a copy would have been sent to the National Security Council." Moreover, the magazine reported, another document alerted the administration to al-Libi's unreliability before the State of the Union address and the argument to the Security Council. The CIA had issued a report in September 2002 which included al-Libi's claims. However, in January, 2003, it produced an amended report which "noted that the detainee was not in a position to know if any training had taken place." 45

Al-Libi recanted his claims in 2004.

Distortions: the decision hadn't been made

While preparing for war and persuading Congress and the people that it was necessary, the administration pretended that no decision had been made to go to war. On August 26, 2002, Mr. Cheney said that the President would "proceed cautiously and deliberately to consider all possible options to deal with the threat that an Iraq ruled by Saddam Hussein represents." He would "consult widely with the Congress and with our friends and allies before deciding upon a course of action." 46 On November 12, Press Secretary Scott McClellan said that "the president continues to seek a peaceful resolution. War is a last resort." 47 On November 21, NS Advisor Rice said that "we all want very much to see this resolved in a peaceful way" and "I think that we have to realize that we're not yet at the stage of talking about military action." 48

On December 31, the President, asked by a reporter about "a possible war with Iraq," replied, "You said we're headed to war in Iraq -- I don't know why you say that. I hope we're not headed to war in Iraq. I'm the person who gets to decide, not you. I hope this can be done peacefully." 49 In the State of the Union, he said "we seek peace" and "if war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause." Incredibly, he was still peddling that line on March 6, 2003: "I've not made up our mind about military action. Hopefully, this can be done peacefully." 50

We now know otherwise. In late March 2003, a few days after the war began, The New Yorker published an article on the origin of the war plans. Richard Haas, the director of policy planning at the State Department, was asked "whether there had been a particular moment when he realized that war was definitely coming." He replied,

The moment was the first week of July[2002], when I had a meeting with Condi. . . . And I raised this issue about were we really sure that we wanted to put Iraq front and center at this point, given the war on terrorism and other issues. And she said, essentially, that that decision's been made, don't waste your breath. . . .51
The Downing Street Memo of July, 23, 2002 confirms that:
C [the head of MI-6] reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. . . .
***

The Defence Secretary said that . . . [n]o decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. . . .52

An article in The New York Times on June 14, 2005, in attempting to downplay the Memo, instead provided further confirmation: "Three years ago, the near-unanimous conventional wisdom in Washington held that Mr. Bush was determined to topple Saddam Hussein by any means necessary."

Distortions: proceeding in the face of ignorance

The administration was prepared to argue the case for war despite, and almost in reliance on, lack of information. This was neatly encapsulated in Secretary Rumsfeld's dictum "absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence."

The pattern was disclosed, after the war began, in a New York Times article 53 entitled "In Sketchy Data, White House Sought Clues to Gauge Threat." It began by noting that, in 2002, "Bush administration officials insisted that they had compelling new evidence about Iraq's prohibited weapons programs, and only occasionally acknowledged in public how little they actually knew about the current status of Baghdad's chemical, biological or nuclear arms." The problem was that the departure of the inspectors from Iraq eliminated the only reliable sources of information. "In a series of recent interviews, intelligence and other officials described the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House as essentially blinded after the United Nations inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in 1998. They were left grasping for whatever slivers they could obtain, like unconfirmed reports of attempts to buy uranium, or fragmentary reports about the movements of suspected terrorists." Not to worry: ignorance is no problem. Here are the expressions of that theory, from the Times' article:

Richard Kerr, who headed a four-member team of retired C.I.A. officials that reviewed prewar intelligence about Iraq, said analysts at the C.I.A. and other agencies were forced to rely heavily on evidence that was five years old at least.

Intelligence analysts drew heavily "on a base of hard evidence growing out of the lead-up to the first [1991] war, the first war itself and then the inspections process," Mr. Kerr said. "We had a rich base of information," he said, and, after the inspectors left, "we drew on that earlier base."

The administration pretended that it knew what was going on in Iraq, but was relying on information long out of date. To rely on facts five years old would be dangerous and irresponsible, to rely on those twelve or more years out of date would be nothing short of bizarre. However, that was what happened.
Condoleezza Rice, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, said today that the question of new evidence versus old was beside the point. "The question of what is new after 1998 is not an interesting question," she said. "There is a body of evidence since 1991. You have to look at that body of evidence and say what does this require the United States to do? Then you are compelled to act.
Here we take the ignorance-is-bliss theory a step further. Not only is there no recent information, what it might be isn't even interesting. The administration was content to make its case on intelligence known to be obsolete. Information about Iraq's capabilities as of 1991 was meaningless because of the subsequent destruction of its facilities and stores; the same was true in large part up to 1998.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld offered a nuanced analysis to Congress last week about the role that American intelligence played as the administration built its case against Mr. Hussein. "The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder," he said. "We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on Sept. 11."
Rumsfeld's comment about 9-11 says more and less than he intended. Politically, Rumsfeld said it all: after 9-11, the administration needed to hit someone, and Iraq was a good target. Analytically, however, it makes no sense. Absence of evidence is absence of evidence, viewed through a prism or otherwise. There was no evidence that Iraq had anything to do with 9-11 or that it was allied with al Qaeda.

Perhaps his point was that the world is more dangerous than we thought, that we are no longer invulnerable, that we must protect ourselves. However, that still doesn't lead to his conclusion. Until it became useful to argue otherwise, the administration acknowledged that Iraq was under control.

Distortions: the threat from Iraq

The entire disinformation campaign was based on the claim that Iraq was a threat to us. This was alleged constantly from the summer of 2002 until the invasion in March, 2003. On August 26, 2002, Cheney referred to Iraq as "a mortal threat."

. . . Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined. The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action.

. . . And the entire world must know that we will take whatever action is necessary to defend our freedom and our security.54

On September 8, Rice chimed in. Asked whether Iraq was "a clear and present danger to the United States," she said this:
There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein's regime is a danger to the United States and to its allies, to our interests.

It is also a danger that is gathering momentum, and it simply makes no sense to wait any longer to do something about the threat that is posed here. As the president has said, "The one option that we do not have is to do nothing." 55


And later in the same interview, she said that Saddam "poses a clear threat to the United States."

On September 26, Bush described the danger as grave and growing.56 The following day, he described Saddam Hussein as "a man who hates America, a man who loves to link up with Al Qaeda, a man who is a true threat to America." 57

On October 2, Iraq became "a threat of unique urgency." 58 This went on, week after week. In the State of the Union, Iraq was a "serious and mounting threat to our country."

But they knew otherwise. In February of 2001, Powell said this:

The fact of the matter is that both baskets, the UN basket and what we and other allies have been doing in the region, have succeeded in containing Saddam Hussein and his ambitions. His forces are about one-third their original size. They don't really possess the capability to attack their neighbors the way they did ten years ago. The danger he presents to the world is that he does pursue weapons of mass destruction, against the agreements that he entered into. . . .

Containment has been a successful policy, and I think we should make sure that we continue it until such time as Saddam Hussein comes into compliance with the agreements he made at the end of the war. . . .59

A few days later, he discussed the sanctions against Iraq. They existed "for the purpose of keeping in check Saddam Hussein's ambitions toward developing weapons of mass destruction." They remained important. "And frankly they have worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors. . . .60

In an interview in July, 2001, Rice made essentially the same point: "But in terms of Saddam Hussein being there, let's remember that his country is divided, in effect. He does not control the northern part of his country. We are able to keep arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt." 61

On September 16, 2001, Cheney said that "Saddam Hussein's bottled up, at this point . . . ." 62

The Bush administration didn't merely repeat earlier statements. It pushed the country into war through conscious misrepresentation.

____________________________

1. www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/02/17/transcripts/clinton.iraq/
2. www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/1997/t11251997_t1125ptr.html
3. http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980219b.html
4. www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/12/08/981208_berger_iraq.html
5. There are two version of the Gore speech available on the web. www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-09-23-gore-text_x.htm appears to be the prepared text and www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-09gore-speech.html appears to be the speech as given. I have used the former because Brooks' quote is from it.
6. http://hsgac.senate.gov/030102einhorn.htm
7. Several of Mr. Brooks' quotes were criticized in The Daily Kos, which provided a link to comments by Mr. Einhorn which may reflect a change of mind. See www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2005/11/3/105653/307
8. www.theatlantic.com/doc/200401/pollack
9. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/18/AR2005111802397.html
10. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html
11. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html
12. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html
13. www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html This part of the report was declassified in July, 2003.
14. http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20021220a5.html
15. www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n002.shtml
16. www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t01232003_t0123cfr.html
17. www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml
18. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html
19. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030722-12.html
20. See my note of August 9, 2003 for the list and sources. Most of the list was published in The Washington Post on August 8, 2003.
21. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html
22. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html
23. www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml
24. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020925-1.html
25. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020926-7.html
26. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html
27. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021014-4.html
28. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021014-3.html
29.www.dod.gov/transcripts/2002/t09222002_t921londontimes.html
30. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021202-4.html
31. www.dod.mil/releases/2003/b01202003_bt027-03.html
32. Transcript of a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, apparently no longer available on the State Department web site. The first paragraph was quoted in The New York Times on 1/27/03.
33. http://usatoday.com/news/world/2002-07-28-iraq-al-qaeda_x.htm
34. http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/26/time.iraq/
35. www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-09-26-iraq-alqaeda_x.htm
36. www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.congress08oct08,0,2232015.story?coll=bal-iraq-storyutil
37. www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0803/080803nj2.htm
38. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021115-6.html
39. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html
40. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2727471.stm
41. U.S. Public Beliefs on Iraq and the Presidential Election, www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqBeliefs_Apr04/IraqBeliefs%20Apr04%20rpt.pdf
42. www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec02/rice_9-25.html
43. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html
44. http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2005/DIAletter.102605.pdf
45. www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9991919/site/newsweek/
46. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html
47. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021112-5.html
48. www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0211/doc10.htm#05
49. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021231-1.html
50. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html
51. www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030331fa_fact
52. www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
53. Datelined July 19, but published July 20, 2003.
54. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html
55. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html
56. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020926-7.html
57. The New York Times 9/28/02.
58. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-7.html
59. www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/february/me0222a.html
60. http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/powell-cairo.htm This source is a copy of a State Department page which apparently no longer exists.
61. http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0107/29/le.00.html
62. www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html

December 7, 2005

President Bush's speech at the Naval Academy on November 301 brought differing responses. The headline the next day in The New York Times was "Bush gives plan for Iraq victory and withdrawal," which no doubt was the message intended. Similarly, The Washington Post headline was "Bush presents plan to win Iraq war." Others were more skeptical. The Seattle Times had "Bush changes tone, not course." A Sargent cartoon described the message as "Different box, same cereal."

A change of tone

Some of the rhetoric was familiar. There was the tired, deceitful, desperate implication of a connection to 9-11: "The terrorists in Iraq share the same ideology as the terrorists who struck the United States on September the 11th." There was the ritual warning that we have to fight them there to avoid fighting them here: "If we were not fighting and destroying this enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle. They would be plotting and killing Americans across the world and within our own borders."

However, in places there was a different tone than in earlier speeches. Mr. Bush acknowledged that "terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al Qaeda" make up the smallest element of the insurgency. He admitted that things have not always gone as planned, specifically that progress in training and using Iraqi forces has been slow.

The most significant shift in tone - or, more accurately, in emphasis - was the concentration on where we go from here. Until now, Mr. Bush has persisted in defending the decision to go to war, even though public concern is focused on how we end it. This time, his speech was devoted to outlining his plan to reach that goal.

A plan for victory?

There wasn't much doubt that the theme was "victory." The word was used fourteen times - fifteen if we include a reference to the document released with the speech, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq2 - and was plastered all over the podium. However, the plan to achieve it isn't anything to inspire confidence.

Previously, the administration's strategy had two "tracks," labeled "political" and "security." Now, with the addition of "economic," there are three "elements." The last term may not endure either; Mr. Bush used it once and then referred to three "sides" of the strategy. The terminology became even more tangled. Mr. Bush said that, over the next few days, he would be discussing the various "pillars" of the strategy for Iraq; however, he then proposed to focus in this speech on one "aspect" of that strategy, the training of Iraqi security forces. The semantic muddles are more significant when we get to the subjects of victory and withdrawal.

The new twist to the political side is "working with the Iraqis to help them engage those who can be persuaded to join the new Iraq -- and to marginalize those who never will." This apparently means pressuring Sunni Arabs to leave the resistance and support the government. Good luck. Some reports suggest that making a deal with the Sunni insurgents might be possible, but that didn't seem to be what Mr. Bush had in mind; it wouldn't fit well with a pledge of victory.

As to security, the program now is one of "cleaning out areas controlled by the terrorists and Saddam loyalists, leaving Iraqi forces to hold territory taken from the enemy, and following up with targeted reconstruction to help Iraqis rebuild their lives." This depends on far more progress in the capacity of the Iraqi forces than has been visible to date. On Tuesday, suicide bombers killed at least 27 people at a Baghdad police academy, not an indication that Iraqi forces can provide security. However, according to Mr. Bush, "Iraqi units are growing more independent and more capable; they are defending their new democracy with courage and determination."

"And on the economic side, we're helping the Iraqis rebuild their infrastructure, reform their economy, and build . . . prosperity . . . ." "Reform" sounds like a euphemism for privatization, prosperity is not in evidence, and the reference under security to "targeted reconstruction" is inconsistent with the claim to be rebuilding any significant part of the infrastructure. (The President made a speech in Washington this morning on the economic element; its claims were cautious and selective.)

A plan for withdrawal?

The President always has made any discussion of withdrawal difficult by his brave statements about staying the course, not giving in to terrorists, not losing our nerve, and accepting nothing less than victory. Some parts of the Annapolis speech signaled a change, others not; there were hints of partial withdrawal, but the usual defiance was there too. He appeared to be trying to retain the macho rhetoric while edging toward some form of force reduction.

In the former mode, he referred to "withdrawal" only by way of rejecting timetables, and there was the usual bluster: "We will never back down. We will never give in. And we will never accept anything less than complete victory." "We will stay as long as necessary to complete the mission. If our military leaders tell me we need more troops, I will send them." In fact, troop strength has been increased from 137,000 to 160,000, a fact he acknowledged. If there is a partial withdrawal, the first step will be merely to return to the former level.

The latter mode is exemplified by a variation on "as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." The current version: "As the Iraqi forces gain experience and the political process advances, we will be able to decrease our troop levels in Iraq without losing our capability to defeat the terrorists."

At one point Mr. Bush combined the two modes:

Most Americans want two things in Iraq: They want to see our troops win, and they want to see our troops come home as soon as possible. And those are my goals as well. I will settle for nothing less than complete victory. . . . Victory will come when the terrorists and Saddamists can no longer threaten Iraq's democracy, when the Iraqi security forces can provide for the safety of their own citizens, and when Iraq is not a safe haven for terrorists to plot new attacks on our nation.

As we make progress toward victory, Iraqis will take more responsibility for their security, and fewer U.S. forces will be needed to complete the mission.

This says that a drawdown can begin after progress by Iraqi forces. It probably says that a final withdrawal of American troops will not come before "complete victory" and doesn't say clearly that it will come even then.

Is "complete victory" the same as "victory," and is "victory will come when. . . " a definition? Even so assuming, full withdrawal would depend on the ability of Iraq's security forces to maintain order, no small hurdle, but there may be more. Mr. Bush urged his audience to read the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq to gain "a clear understanding of . . . how we define victory. . . ." That document contains a section entitled "Victory in Iraq defined," which advises us that the "ultimate victory will be achieved in stages." As to the last or "longer term" stage, it tells us that its authors "expect" the following:

An Iraq that has defeated the terrorists and neutralized the insurgency.

An Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country.

An Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terror and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, integrated into the international community, an engine for regional economic growth, and proving the fruits of democratic governance to the region.3
Does this definition-by-expectation equate to Mr. Bush's "complete victory?" If so, the troops may never come home.

It's doubtful that the document's oddly-framed definition has any significance beyond an unrealistic hope, which leaves open the meaning of Mr. Bush's phrase. However, that may be the intent and it certainly is the reality. The definition of victory, complete or otherwise, will remain vague and flexible, partly because the administration probably has aims that it isn't sharing with us and partly because it has no clue as to how all of this will turn out.

The most that can be said of this aspect of the speech is that it admits the possibility of partial withdrawal, and that doesn't amount to much. Domestic political considerations almost certainly will lead to some drawdown before next November, regardless of the rhetoric.

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

Mr. Bush described this document as "an unclassified version of the strategy we've been pursuing in Iraq," which isn't even a good fib; the "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" is an exercise in PR.

According to an article in Sunday's New York Times, it was drafted at least in part by a Duke professor, Peter Feaver, now an advisor to the NSC.4 Prior to his appointment, Dr. Feaver had concluded, based on a study of polls, that Americans will accept casualties if they perceive that the war will succeed. That would lead an administration anxious to recapture public support to emphasize "victory." The National Strategy uses the term 21 times, not including the table of contents and the executive summary.

A colleague of Dr. Feaver's, Dr. Christopher Gelpi, acknowledged that it "is not really a strategy document" but is "clearly targeted at American public opinion." He said that it - and the speech - "hit exactly on the themes our research said they should."

The manipulation goes on.

_____________________________

1. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130-2.html
2. www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf
3. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 3.
4. The story of how Dr. Feaver's role was discovered is told cryptically in the Times, and in detail in Dan Foomkin's "White House Briefing" of 11/5 and 11/6. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/

December 18, 2005

Two weeks ago, President Bush took a short break from tall tales about Iraq to tell a few about the economy. He started with a brief summary on December 2, touting his "sound economic policies of cutting taxes and restraining spending."1 He elaborated on December 5.

In his speech that day, given at a John Deere-Hitachi plant in N. Carolina, Mr. Bush claimed that his tax cuts have spurred job growth. "In the spring of 2003," he said, an unnamed Democrat had argued that "tax relief" would not create jobs. Well, just look, the President bragged:

Since those words were spoken, our economy has added nearly four and a half million new jobs.

Just this past Friday, the latest figures show our economy added 215,000 jobs in the month of November alone. Our unemployment rate is down to five percent . . . . People are being able to find work, and that's what's important to me. I want Americans working. I want anybody who wants a job to be able to find work -- good paying, steady work -- and that's what's happening in America. 2


Presumably his source was a table produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics which shows a gain of 215,000 jobs as the preliminary figure for November; it also shows a gain of nearly 4.5 million since May, 2003.3 Therefore, Mr. Bush's numbers are valid, but he offered no evidence that the gains were caused by tax cuts.

His choice of time frame was convenient; May, 2003 was the low point of the employment decline which began in March, 2001. The gain in jobs since May, 2003 is 4,462,000, an average of 148,733 per month. However, if, instead of looking at the period most congenial to Mr, Bush, we consider his full time in office, the numbers are much different: we lost 2,627,000 jobs between January, 2001 and May, 2003. Therefore, from January, 2001 to the present the gain in jobs has been 1,835,000, 31,102 per month. (Similarly, the current unemployment rate of 5% compares well to May, 2003, at 6.1%, but not to January, 2001, when it was 4.2%.4 )

In addition, job growth numbers, taken alone, are misleading. The labor force also grows, and if not enough jobs are created to keep up with that growth, the government can't brag (legitimately) about creating jobs. It isn't possible to compare Mr. Bush's numbers directly to the growth in the work force, as the BLS doesn't seem to produce a report on the latter using the same data base. However, it does produce both reports from another data base.5 They show that, from May, 2003 through November, 2005, the labor force grew by 3,698,000 and jobs grew by 5,042,000, a net gain of 1,344,000. That's a good number, but not the four and one-half million claimed. The record for the entire Bush period is dismal: work force growth of 6,388,000, job growth of 4,823,000, a deficit of 1,565,000: 26,525 too few jobs per month.

Mr. Bush claimed other economic benefits from his tax-cutting policy:

Americans are buying homes . . . . Real disposable income is up; our consumers are confident. New orders for durable goods, like machinery, have risen sharply, and shipments of manufactured goods are up, as well. Business activity in our manufacturing sector reported its 30th straight month of growth. In the past five years, productivity has grown at some of the fastest rates since the 1960s. Our small businesses are thriving. Fortunately, I didn't listen to the pessimists about tax cuts. The tax cuts are working.

"In the past five years, productivity has grown . . . ." Yes; output per hour was up 14.4% in 2004 over 2000.6 Have workers shared in the benefits? Mr. Bush would like us to think so: "Real disposable income is up." He didn't identify his source, or the population or time frame. However, the White House web site contains several charts with links to the agency reports underlying them.7 The relevant chart is of per capita real (constant-dollar), disposable (after-tax) income through October. It shows a slight increase in October but a decline for the year. From January, 2004 through October, 2005, there was an annualized increase of 1.36%. Even that probably was inflated by increases for wealthy folks, who benefit most from tax cuts.

By most measures, working people are not doing well. Two Census Bureau reports of before-tax income illustrate this. One shows that real median and real mean household income dropped slightly from 2003 to 2004, the fourth straight annual loss for each.8 Another shows that real mean household income dropped in 2004 in the lowest four quintiles, but rose slightly in the fifth, due to an increase for the top 5%.9

The national poverty rate rose to 12.7 percent last year, the fourth consecutive annual increase. The percentage of those without health insurance remained unchanged from the previous year.10

After summarizing the supposed benefits of tax cuts, Mr. Bush told an outright whopper: "We've been wise with your money, as well." Consider just one measure of the administration's wisdom: the national debt has increased by more than 2.3 trillion dollars on Mr. Bush's watch.11

He didn't mention the debt, but did address the deficit: "We're on track to reach our goal of cutting the budget deficit in half by 2009." The deficit that he proposes to cut is the one for fiscal 2004. That's convenient, as 2004 was his worst year, so it's the easiest deficit to reduce by half. Further, the base line isn't the actual 2004 deficit of $412 billion, but the one projected in February, 2004, $521 billion; that figure was suspected at the time of having been inflated for the purpose. And the final gimmick is that the goal is not to cut the deficit in dollars, but only as a percentage of gross domestic product. The February, 2004 number was 4.5% of GDP. All of this, other than the intentional inflation, is set out in documents published by the Office of Management and Budget.12

Where does this twisting path lead us? Using the artificial February forecast as the base, the deficit will have been "cut in half" if can be brought down to 2.25% of GDP. OMB estimates that the fiscal 2009 deficit will fall to $162 billion, a mere 1.1% of predicted GDP. Even if the OMB deficit projection is too low, as it almost certainly is, Mr. Bush could claim victory if the 2009 deficit were in the 340 billion range, based on estimates of GDP by OMB and the Congressional Budget Office.

According to CBO, the deficit will be 321 billion in 2009, 2.1% of GDP, 13 still a success for the President. Of course if one picks any starting number other than the phony 521 billion, the result would be different. The actual 2004 deficit rate was 3.6%; 1.8% of the highest GDP estimate is 277 billion.

However, Mr. Bush can always fall back on the Cheney dictum: Reagan proved that deficits don't matter.


____________________________

1. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051202-1.html

2. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051205-4.html

3. "Total nonfarm employment," http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?ce

4. http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS14000000

5. "Employment level - civilian labor force" and "Civilian labor force level." http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?ln These reports are from the "current population survey; the table Mr. Bush referred to is from the "current employment statistics survey."

6. Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=PRS85006092

7. www.whitehouse.gov/fsbr/income.html

8. www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h06ar.html and www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h03ar.html

9. See a supplement to the Census Bureau 2004 report at www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h03ar.html

10. "Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2004," issued by the Census Bureau in August, 2005, pp. 9, 16; www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf

11. www.publicdebt.treas.gov/cgi-bin/cgiwrap/~www/opdpen.cgi

12. The current document, the Mid-Session Review for fiscal 2006, is at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/06msr.pdf
The Mid-Session 2005 is at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/05msr.pdf

13. www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1944&sequence=0 The CBO estimate is dated 8/15/05, the OMB 7/13/05.

December 21, 2005

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer seems to be on a long slide to oblivion, with help from The Seattle Times. The Joint Operating Agreement is all that stands between the P-I and failure; Hearst is unable or unwilling to support the paper as an independent entity. The JOA allows the Times to withdraw if it sustains losses for three consecutive years. It claims that it did so during 2000-2002; that is in litigation. Recently the Times notified Hearst that it claims losses for 2003 and 2004 also. If it puts together three years that pass scrutiny, it can put the P-I out of business, which it clearly wants to do.

Whether or not the Times proves its losses, the P-I's days may be numbered. Circulation fell at both papers in the years after the JOA was signed in 1981. The Times stabilized its circulation by switching to morning publication in 1999, but the direct competition has sent theP-I down sharply.

The P-I was - in my opinion, admittedly a minority one - the better paper until recently, but it is showing the strain. Both papers have become less substantial and less substantive over the years, although the Times has rebounded to a small degree. The P-I just continues its slide. Much of the first three pages is devoted to pictures and news squibs. Those on yesterday's front page referred to stories inside; those on pages 2 and 3 covered their subjects in two or three paragraphs: more than fillers, but not much. Splashed across the top of page one of yesterday's paper were three illustrated teasers for stories inside: "10 reasons to love bowl games; "Pursuing the perfect smile;" "Back pain? Yoga helps." A review of "The Apprentice" has been carried on page one of the business section. George Bush isn't the only one living in a bubble.

_________________

The P-I still has the better op-ed page. Yesterday's included columns by George Will, and Helen Thomas and an editorial from The Independent.

Mr. Will has noticed, belatedly, that the Bush administration is driven by a lust for unchecked power. The occasion, as it has been for so much shocked realization, is the disclosure of the President's authorization of domestic spying by the NSA. Mr. Will surmised that the justification for the action is the host of powers currently claimed to emanate from the designation of the president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. (An interesting irony is that apologists for executive power are as dependant on penumbras as privacy advocates).

Mr. Will thinks that we need to debate the question "Who decides which tactics -- e.g., domestic surveillance -- should be considered part of taking 'military actions'?" He notes that Republicans, in office, seem to forget their aversion to presidential power. However, his concern is primarily for the niceties of procedure; he would approve of domestic snooping if our complaint Congress and passive judiciary had been allowed to assent: "On the assumption that Congress or a court would have been cooperative in September 2001, and that the cooperation could have kept necessary actions clearly lawful without conferring any benefit on the nation's enemies, the president's decision to authorize the NSA's surveillance without the complicity of a court or Congress was a mistake."

Will doesn't seem to grasp the substantive issue, but some degree of awareness of the administration's excesses must be considered progress.

The other two comments were about Iraq. Helen Thomas noted that Paul Wolfowitz refuses to accept any responsibility for the disaster he helped to bring about. In a question period following a speech on December 7, there was this exchange:

MR. DUNHAM: Looking back now, how do you account for the intelligence failures regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, I don't have to, and it's not just because I don't work for the U.S. government anymore. I mean, in my old job I didn't have to. I was, like everyone else, outside the intelligence community and not just in the Bush administration, but in the Clinton administration; not just in the United States, but in the U.K. and France and elsewhere. We relied on the intelligence community for those judgements. So the question is, in a way, how do they account for it, or how did the commissions that have attempted to understand it and account for it?1


I suppose that the somewhat mangled reference to other countries and the Clinton administration is intended to reiterate the standard everyone-believed-it defense. On a personal level, the defense is that it wasn't his job, even though the Defense Department, in which he was number two, has the largest slice of the intelligence budget and set up its own unit to massage information about Iraq.

The Independent offered an objective view of the election in Iraq and a caution to those who opposed the war: don't wish for bad news.

Those who disagreed with the invasion of Iraq should be the first to welcome a momentous week in the history of that country. The Independent does not intend to fall into the trap of being accused of rejoicing in lawlessness, human rights abuses and a slide into civil war. The Iraqi elections on Thursday were a hopeful occasion. . . .

In its effort to avoid that trap, it painted a picture, both about the election and the general situation in Iraq, which seems too optimistic to me. But the message is valid: if we want to extract our troops from Iraq, we'd better hope for good news.
. . . It may be too late to put the broken country back together again, but at least the Iraqi people have spoken.

They want their country to remain united and they want foreign troops to leave as soon as possible; 45 percent want the occupying forces to leave as soon as a government is formed. The elections have brought the day nearer when British and U.S. troops can come home, and so the relative success of democracy in Iraq should be celebrated as much here and in the United States as in Baghdad and Basra.



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1. I haven't posted the URL for this transcript because any direct access is blocked. A Google search of "Wolfowitz National Press Club" will turn it up.

December 31, 2005

The almost-daily revelations of Bush administration transgressions make it baffling that the public doesn't react with righteous anger. Pick almost any subject - presidential power, war and peace, international relations, treaties, treatment of prisoners, civil liberties, national security preparedness, disaster response, the environment, poverty, tax equity, health care, the deficit, the national debt, management of public funds, honesty and transparency in government - and you will find a breach of trust, an immoral act or an offense against the common good. It's a record of hubris, foolishness, dishonesty, hypocrisy, regression, repression, irresponsibility, ignorance and incompetence. The recent instances are typical of the genre.
On November 2, Dana Priest disclosed in The Washington Post that

The CIA has been hiding and interrogating some of its most important al Qaeda captives at a Soviet-era compound in Eastern Europe, according to U.S. and foreign officials familiar with the arrangement.

The secret facility is part of a covert prison system set up by the CIA nearly four years ago that at various times has included sites in eight countries . . . .


Scott McClellan reacted in predictable fashion: "The leaking of classified information is a serious matter . . . ." Running a gulag apparently isn't. Dennis Hastert and Bill Frist called for an investigation, not of the secret prison system or the circumstances under which prisoners were sent there, or their treatment, but of the leak to the Post. (Another Republican, Senator Lindsey Graham, did grasp the issue: "Talk about not seeing the forest for the trees. The real story is those jails.")

In early December, it was revealed that torture has been practiced in prisons run by Iraqi forces. Condemnation certainly was called for but, coming from us, a measure of humility also would have been appropriate. That was not in evidence. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said "This is unacceptable for this kind of abuse to take place."1 Mr. Bush added his bit: "This conduct is unacceptable . . . . Those who committed these crimes must be held to account." 2 That, of course, brings to mind the official reaction to the Abu Ghraib scandals. There, as here, the grunts were blamed and those who established the policies and set the tone not only skated, but got to do the condemning.

Abu Ghraib prompted the McCain anti-torture amendment. Bush and Cheney were so determined to block it that the White House threatened a veto of the defense appropriation bill to which it was attached. Apart from its inconsistency with the administration's claim that it never uses torture, the veto threat provided an interesting contrast to the Republican charges during the 2004 campaign that Senator Kerry was unpatriotic or weak in voting against defense spending.

On December 16, James Risen and Eric Lichtblau revealed in The New York Times that, in early 2002, "President Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying, according to government officials." Unauthorized electronic surveillance is a crime under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

However, after setting the surveillance program in motion, President Bush continued to reassure us that the controls remained in force. He said this in April, 2004:

. . . Now, by the way, any time you hear the United States government talking about wiretap, it requires -- a wiretap requires a court order. Nothing has changed, by the way. When we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking about getting a court order before we do so. It's important for our fellow citizens to understand, when you think Patriot Act, constitutional guarantees are in place when it comes to doing what is necessary to protect our homeland, because we value the Constitution.3

The administration has attempted to explain away the discrepancy by arguing that the quote refers only to the Patriot Act, a typical evasion. Mr. Bush said any time the government wants to wiretap, it must get a court order, and nothing has changed, meaning the old rules still apply. Both were false statements.

The Justice Department defended the President's actions in a letter which admitted that they did not comply with the FISA, but that compliance is not necessary.4 The first argument was that Congress approved domestic spying in the Authorization for the Use of Force resolution adopted immediately after 9-11. The resolution "clearly contemplates action within the United States," it claimed. John Dean commented that "No sane member of Congress believes that the [resolution] provided such an authorization. . . . It is not merely a stretch; it is ludicrous."5 Former Senator Daschle showed just how ludicrous it is in an op-ed column in The Washington Post on December 23:

On the evening of Sept. 12, 2001, the White House proposed that Congress authorize the use of military force to "deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States." Believing the scope of this language was too broad and ill defined, Congress chose instead, on Sept. 14, to authorize "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons [the president] determines planned, authorized, committed or aided" the attacks of Sept. 11. . . .

Just before the Senate acted on this compromise resolution, the White House sought one last change. Literally minutes before the Senate cast its vote, the administration sought to add the words "in the United States and" after "appropriate force" in the agreed-upon text. This last-minute change would have given the president broad authority to exercise expansive powers not just overseas -- where we all understood he wanted authority to act -- but right here in the United States, potentially against American citizens. I could see no justification for Congress to accede to this extraordinary request for additional authority. I refused.

The Bush administration now argues those powers were inherently contained in the resolution adopted by Congress -- but at the time, the administration clearly felt they weren't or it wouldn't have tried to insert the additional language.


The other argument is that the President has inherent authority for domestic spying. Inherent, and essentially unlimited, presidential power has been asserted repeatedly in the "enemy combatant" cases, usually under the guise of respecting separation of powers, which in context means that the President's decisions are not to be reviewed. Most recently, the government asked the Supreme Court to admonish the Fourth Circuit, heretofore one of its favorite courts, for insufficient subservience; the government's petition described the Court of Appeals' opinion in Padilla v. Hanft as "an unwarranted attack on the exercise of executive discretion" which raises "profound separation-of-powers concerns."6 All of this is a great deal to read into "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States," but that is the official interpretation of the Constitution: unlimited power to the president. Mr. Dean identified John Yoo as the principal author of that doctrine and described Yoo's legal thinking as "bordering on fantasy." The same might be said of many of the administration's policies.

The NSA disclosure prompted talk of impeachment. Desperate to change the subject, the administration has launched an investigation into the leak. The Justice Department, having declared that the President has the authority to break the law by spying, will find out whether someone broke a law by telling that he did. Newspapers cooperated by running front-page stories about the investigation. The White House pretended that it had no part in ordering the probe, that Bush's buddy Alberto Gonzales merely responded to a request from NSA.

It all would be comic if the consequences weren't so awful.


__________________________________

1. The Washington Post 12/14/05; CBSNews.com 12/13/05.
2. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051212-4.html
3. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040420-2.html
4. The Washington Post 12/23/05; Associated Press 12/23/05:
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/10577975/
5. http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20051230.html
6. The New York Times 12/29/05.
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